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Uruguay has been traditionally characterized as one of the most stable and representative 
democracies in Latin America. Part of this evaluation rest on the strength of its political 
institutions and the clear preferences of citizens and elites to conceive democracy as the 
best regime to solve political conflicts (Latinobarometro 2004). Furthermore, to a large 
extent, the dominant view of Uruguay as one of the strongest democracies in Latin 
America lies on the way in which the policy making process takes place and particularly 
the form in which institutions and actors interact in the making of most policy outputs. 
This interaction between a complex institutional design with a large number of actors 
(with divergent preferences), has made of Uruguay an outlier during the last ten years of 
economic and state reforms in the region (Lora 2001). In this context, the budgetary 
policy in Uruguay represents one of the best examples to illustrate the extent to which 
politics and institutions affect policy outputs.  
 
This paper explores the extent to which Uruguayan institutions (as interbranch relations, 
electoral rules, budgetary rules, etc…) and political actors (parties, factions, interest 
groups and bureaucrats) involved in the budgetary process affect the fiscal performance 
of governments in terms of sustainability, efficiency and representativeness. Since the 
early nineties and the beginning of the structural adjustment and the economic reforms of 
the Washington Consensus, Uruguay has been strongly committed to implement a 
restrictive fiscal policy. However, unlike most Latin American countries, Uruguay has 
been able to sustain a relatively large public sector and particularly the largest welfare 
state in the region. To a large extent, this particular combination is the result of a 
democracy characterized by a large number of veto players, where the institutions and the 
policy preferences of the political actors are key explanatory factors. It is in this context 
that the budget law has become the most important piece of legislation for all incumbent 
governments and relevant political actors.   
 
The paper is structured in six chapters. Chapter one describes the broad policy making 
process (PMP) and the set of actors and institutions characterizing the Uruguayan 
political system. Chapter two describes the budgetary policy making process (BP), in 
terms of its legal procedures and the actors involved in this process. Chapter three 
combines the features of the PMP and the BP concluding with a set of hypothesis dealing 
with the level of Sustainability, Efficiency and Representativeness of the fiscal policy. 
Chapter four develops those hypotheses with evidence on public expenditures, indicators 
of efficiency of the public sector and the process in which the budget bill is negotiated, 
involving institutions and actors. Chapter five discuses the main findings and concludes.  
 
  21. The Uruguayan Policy Making Process 
1.1. Political Institutions 
 
Political structures are basically composed by two sets of rules. On the one hand, 
governmental institutions are shaped by rules concerning the balance of power in inter-
branch relationships. On the other hand, electoral systems are orthogonal to executive-
legislative relations, since the political consequences yielded by those rules affect the 
number of actors in the policy making process (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001; Scartascini and M 2003). Additionally, two mechanisms of direct 
democracy complement the executive-legislative relations and the electoral rules as the 
whole set of political structures. 
 
First, Uruguay is a presidential regime with several differences regarding the 
paradigmatic U.S case. The main feature of the Uruguayan political system deals with the 
influence exerted by the Executive branch over the whole policy making process. This is 
the consequence of an ample set of rules where presidents hold an asymmetric control 
over the legislative agenda.  For instance, Presidents control institutional devices such as 
total or item vetoes, the ability to initiate bills in strategic areas (such as tax policy), the 
possibility to introduce emergency bills, and more importantly, the authority to initiate 
the budget bill. Likewise, Uruguayan presidents hold important non-legislative powers 
over cabinet appointments and other key bureaucratic posts (Buquet et al. 1998).  
 
Second, Presidents are elected for a five-year term without reelection.
2 Until 1996, 
presidents were elected by plurality and Double Simultaneous Vote (DSV). This electoral 
device allowed parties to present multiple candidates for the presidential race, given that 
voters were able cast their ballots primarily for a party and then for a presidential 
candidate within the party. In this context, given that candidates (within parties) were 
able to sum up their votes (for the party) elected presidents were the most voted 
candidates within the winner party. A constitutional reform in 1996 changed this 
controversial electoral rule, setting the presidential election by majority runoff
3. 
Additionally, it was constitutionally established that all parties have to perform primaries 
in order to select their single presidential candidates. 
     
Uruguay has a bicameral Congress. Senators and Representatives are elected by 
proportional representation-closed lists system, under DSV
4 for a five-year term with 
unrestricted reelection. Until 1996 all elections were simultaneously. Currently, 
legislative elections take place with the first round of presidential elections. Citizens cast 
their votes for a list of candidates for the legislature (Senate and Representatives) and the 
presidency in the same ballot. The Senate has 30 members elected in a single national 
                                                 
2 Until the 1966 constitutional reform presidents and legislators had four-year term mandates. 
3 The 1996 constitutional reform removed the DSV for the presidential elections without affecting 
legislative elections.  
4 The different factions within parties provide party lists for the senate and the lower chamber. In the same 
ballot, the voter cast vote for: a) a presidential candidate and his or her corresponding vice-president; b) a 
list of candidates for the senate, and; c) a list of candidates for the lower chamber (see:Buquet et al. 1998). 
  3district plus the vice-president. The chamber of Representatives has 99 members elected 
in 19 multimember electoral districts.
5 In a first step, seats are allocated among parties 
applying the D´Hondt formula on a national basis. Secondly, the distribution takes place 
within parties (among factions), also under proportional representation and within 
districts with a minimum of two representatives for each district. In this way, 
proportional representation is preserved in a perfect fashion. 
   
Complementing the aforementioned factors, the Uruguayan institutional design has 
mechanisms of direct democracy. Among them, there are two remarkable constitutional 
devices that have been used during the last twenty years of democracy. On the one hand, 
the constitution allows citizens to collect 25% of registered voters in order to implement a 
referendum to revoke or endorse the law.
6 However, it is important to note that this 
institutional device does not apply to those bills in which the Executive branch has 
exclusive power to introduce legislation, such as the budget bill. On the other hand, the 
Constitution allows the use of direct democracy to reform the own Constitution. In this 
case, reformers have to promote the amendment with the support of a 10% of registered 
citizens.
7 Although the technical nature of this institution is different to that of the 
referendum, both devices have worked as a reactive device against the reforms carried 
out by all governments since the democratic restoration in 1985. 
 
1.2. Parties and Party System  
 
Uruguay has one of the few institutionalized party systems in Latin America 
(Mainwaring 1999). First, to a large extent, this characterization deals with the fact that 
two out of three parties (Partido Nacional and Partido Colorado) are one the oldest in 
the world history. While Nacionalistas (PN) and Colorados (PC) have 168 years, the left 
                                                 
5 The Uruguayan legislature has two large districts. The national Senate, which elects 30 members plus the 
vice-president and Montevideo for the lower chamber, which elects 44 out of 99 members. In addition to 
these large districts, there is one medium size district (Canelones), and seventeen small two and three-
member districts (corresponding to the countryside departments). 
6 Promoters have been successful in two occasions: “Privatization of major public firms” in 1992 and the 
“Association of the state oil company with private firms” in 2003. They did not achieve their goal to revoke 
the “Amnesty to military involved in human rights violations during the authoritarian regime” in 1989. In 
three occasions the popular support failed in obtaining 25% of the electorate to make use the referendum: 
“Deregulation of transmission, transformation and distribution of electricity” in 1998; The “Reduction of 
the available period to workers to make claims against employers” in 1998, and; the “Improvement of 
Public and Private Services, Public Security and Promotion of Productive Activities” as an emergency law 
passed in 2001. Additionally, there is only one case in which the Parliament anticipated the citizenry. In 
this case, the Parliament revoked a Law in order to avoid the use of a referendum that was surely going to 
be revoked by the citizenry. This was the case for the “partial privatization of the mobile State-owned 
company”.  
7 Two popular initiatives have been successful: “Adjustment of pensions based on wage fluctuations 
(1989), and pension regulations via budgetary amendments” (1994). Pensioners and retirees promoted both 
plebiscites in 1988 and 1993 respectively. Two popular initiatives were unsuccessful: a constitutionally 
fixed budget amount for public education (1994), and financial independence of the Judiciary (1999). Both 
plebiscites were promoted by labor organizations associated with the public education system and the 
Judiciary, and in the latter case the Supreme Court supported the referendum. Currently, there is an 
initiative to be considered by a plebiscite during the next election of 2004, dealing with the state 
management of water resources and its contracts with private firms. 
  4wing Frente Amplio (FA) was born in 1971 (34 years old). This longevity reveals a strong 
stability across time and there are no presages that the current party system will suffer a 
major transformation in the short run.  
 
Until 1971, the Uruguayan party system was a robust bipartism (see Table 1). particularly 
since 1985 and the democratic restoration, the emergence of the left-wing party (FA) 
transformed this format into a multiparty system with tree parties and a half, if we 
considered the systematic presence of a small fourth actor.
8 In any case, the system 
reveals stability and party system change in a slow fashion, unlike non-institutionalized 
party systems.  
 
Table 1: Effective Number of Parties (1962-2004)* 
  1962 1966 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
  Electoral  2.4 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.3 2.5 
  Senate  2.3 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.3 
  Deputies  2.4 2.3 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.4 
   * Source: Buquet et al. 1998 and Corte Electoral 
 
A second relevant feature contributing with the level of institutionalization identifies 
Uruguayan parties as agents with deep roots in society. All parties have been the central 
mechanisms of representation and expression of political interests. Uruguayan voters 
have been identified for decades with Nacionalistas and Colorados and the same signs 
are becoming true for the growing electorate identified with FA. These deep roots in 
society have important political implications. Essentially, it leaves no room for the advent 
of populist leaders that have been characterizing many inchoate Latin American party 
systems. But more importantly, deep roots in society are associated to very low levels of 
electoral volatility, which decreases the chances of political instability (see Table 2).
9  
 
   
Table 2:  Electoral Volatility and Vote Distribution (1962-2004)* 
  1962 1966 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 Average 
 Total Electoral Volatility   7.6  7.6  8.9  5.2  13.3 11.6 10.0 21.9  10.8 
 Colorados and Blancos  91.1 89.7 81.2 76.2 69.2 63.5 55.1 45.7 71.5 
 Frente Amplio  -  -  18.3 21.3 21.2 30.6 39.8 50.4  30.3 
 * Source: Buquet et al. 1998 and Corte Electoral 
 
 
A third factor deals with the recognition of elections and parties as the best mechanism to 
express popular demands. As we said at the outset, Uruguay has been consistently located 
among those countries in which the overwhelming population prefers democracy to any 
other type of political regime. However, it is also true that parties have lost part its 
                                                 
8 The Unión Cívica until 1989, and the Nuevo Espacio between 1989 and 1999.  
9 Comparatively, these values are very low regarding other Latin American countries. According to 
Mainwaring and Scully (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), considering four elections held during 1970-1990, 
Costa Rican electoral volatility was of 18.2; measuring four elections for the Venezuelan case for 1973-
1993, the index was of 17.7; Chile, for three elections during 1973-1993 showed an 18.4 percent of 
electoral volatility. 
  5legitimacy in recent years, as a part of the economic crisis and also other more general 
trends of discredit that politicians have here and around the world. Despite those 
increasing levels of discredit, no outsider and new parties have been able to challenge the 
party system as has been observed in other institutionalized party systems like in 
Venezuela.  
 
Fourth, Uruguayan parties are factionalized. This type of internal organization is the 
direct consequence of electoral rules that facilitate the existence of these agents within 
parties. These factions are institutionalized and stable groups within parties and generally 
lead by presidential candidates or national senators.
10 As can be seen in Table 3 the 
number of factions has remained stable over time, with the only exception of the 1966 
case.  
 
Table 3: Effective Number of Legislative Factions (Senate). 1946-2004* 
 1962 1966 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004  Average 
  Colorado  Party  2.7 4.3 2.8 2.4 3.7 3.1 2.0 1.8  2.7 
  Nacional  (Blanco)  Party  2.5 4.6 3.8 1.8 2.9 4.1 1.7 2.5  2.6 
  Frente  Amplio  - - -  2.5  3.3  3.4  4.7  4.9  3.8 
* Using the same formula for the Effective Number of Parties, this calculus takes into account 
the number of lists for the senate as the best proxy to consider factions. 
Source: Buquet et al. (1998) and Corte Electoral. 
 
The existence of factions within parties does not imply that parties are weak. Parties are 
organized around factions, but they are still relevant agents in the political system, since 
there are rules and procedures to make joint decisions beyond factional divisions or the 
policy preferences of specific factions. In sum, it is important to note that Uruguayan 
parties cannot be considered as unitary actors, because factions are relevant and stable 
agents within and outside parties or the political system as a whole.  
 
Given the electoral rules characterized by a PR-closed list system, faction leaders have a 
strong power to control the nomination process and by implication the party discipline in 
parliament. Since the nomination control rest to a large extent on the leader’s discretion, 
individual legislators have strong incentives to follow his or her faction leader and his 
policy preferences. It follows from this type of nomination process that legislators follow 
the faction discipline. Since faction leaders have control over the nominations, 
undisciplined legislators will not be endorsed for reelection and their chances for gaining 
endorsement for other career paths are fairly low. 
 
Finally, the party system has shown a centripetal mode of political competition. The fact 
that parties are oriented towards government enables the chances to achieve political 
agreements. Before the democratic breakdown in 1973, Uruguayan politics was 
characterized by high levels of ideological polarization affecting the whole policy making 
process and particularly the chances of regime break. However, after 1985 and the 
democratic restoration, the levels of ideological polarization have been characterized by 
                                                 
10 There are no legal impediments to create new factions within parties. However, beyond the interest of 
politicians and voters, its relevance in the political system will depend on its ability to remain stable and 
gain parliamentary representation on a permanent basis. 
  6moderate and low levels of polarization, facilitating the chances to make political 
agreements among parties. 
     
1.3. Characterizing the Uruguayan Policymaking Process (PMP) 
 
Thus far we have argued that the Uruguayan policy making process is influenced by three 
broad institutional features: a) the presidential regime that set terms for both executive 
and legislative powers; b) a president with strong legislative powers to control the ability 
of parties and legislators to influence the PMP; c) a multiparty system with factionalized 
parties. This section shows that the combination of these three features helps to create a 
PMP with a cyclical pattern composed by two discernible periods within each 
presidential term, characterized by cooperation and conflict.  
  
In the context of a presidential regime with a multiparty system, most Uruguayan 
presidents since 1985 have been forced to form governmental coalitions to pass their 
policies. Thus, before each government takes power, most presidents have to negotiate 
the policies to be incorporated in the political agenda. This process implies an intense 
inter and intra-party negotiation process
11, based on an exchange of political support in a 
set of strategic bills (for the president) for cabinet portfolios demanded by those parties 
and factions that will be part of the governmental coalition. Given that transaction costs 
during the stage of coalition building will increase with the share legislative votes in the 
hands of presidents, some costs can be observed in the emergence of new ministries. In 
particular since 1990, some ministries have been created in order to satisfy the demands 
of certain opposition factions or whole parties, like the ministry of Housing during the 
Lacalle administration or Sports during the current government of president Batlle.  
 
During the span of time that presidents are supported by the governmental coalition, they 
are willing to pass the agenda (or at least partially) and the policies negotiated at the 
coalition formation stage. However, as long as the presidential term progresses, the 
incentives for those who cooperate with the president decrease, given that the electoral 
calendar forces coalition members to compete. Indeed, the payoff structure of 
governmental coalitions under presidential systems determines that those who support 
successful governments will receive small benefits (votes), and for this reason coalition 
termination before the electoral campaign begins is a precondition to avoid such electoral 
inefficiencies. On the contrary, those who support unpopular or unsuccessful presidents 
have strong incentives for coalition termination. In both cases, the duration of 
governmental coalitions under presidential systems is limited by the electoral schedule. 
Given the process described above, as long as the term progresses the electoral 
competition leaves most presidents without legislative support to pass their policies. In 
sum, cooperation characterizes the first period of most Uruguayan administrations, while 
competition is the norm in a second stage.  
 
                                                 
11 The intra-party negotiation is the result of the predominant model of parties. Given that parties are 
factionalized, presidents have to negotiate policies with other factions within their parties, in addition to the 
inter-party negotiation in order to form a governmental coalition.    
  7While cooperation periods enable presidents to pass their agenda, competition periods are 
characterized by the presidential inability to buffer the policy preferences of the 
legislature and the opposition parties. In sum, cooperation periods yield policy formation 
under political agreements, while competition periods are more prone to policy stalemate 
or status quo (Buquet et al. 1998). This dynamics implies the ability to develop some 
political exchanges and get some cooperation in several areas, although that cooperation 
will be difficult to sustain until the end of presidential mandates.  
 
The PMP evolves under the above political and institutional dynamics. The agenda 
setting process is determined by the cyclical pattern of government described above. As 
can be observed in Table 4, at the outset of each administration, presidents and coalition 
partners bargain on a set of policies that will prevail in the legislative arena. By 
implication, those policies will have political support in Congress. In addition to those 
contexts in which presidents are supported by governmental coalitions, some institutional 
features give them an important asymmetry in the congressional arena such as the 
authority to introduce the budget bill.  
 
Figure 1 
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Source: ICP/UDELAR (see Appendix 1) 
 
As can be observed in Chart 1, the political context within presidential and legislative 
terms changes as long they advance towards the end of each government. Indeed, most 
presidents systematically lose political support towards the end of their terms, which can 
be clearly observed with the number of important laws that the executive branch is able 
to pass in the legislature. Systematically, during the last years of each government the 
agenda tends to shift from the executive towards the policy preferences of the legislature 
and particularly in favor to those who are leaving the coalition or more specific 
agreements (Buquet et al. 1998). During the second part of the cycle, the policy agenda 
follows a more particularistic pattern, given the electoral proximity and the fact that 
during the first part of the cycle legislators were working with the policy preferences of 
  8the executive.
12 During this period, legislators are more prone to respond (via legislation 
or constituency service) to narrow constituencies and particularly some groups within the 
electorate. However, the most important consequence of this shift in the legislative 
agenda is that because legislators become more proactive by endorsing their own policy 
preferences, it makes more reasonable to observed increasing levels of interbranch 
conflict. As can be observed in Table 4, this makes reasonable to expect an increasing 
number of executive vetoes within presidential and legislative terms. (Magar 2002).   
 
From the brief and preliminary description developed before, it must be noted that the 
number of veto gates and veto players with power over policy decisions is relatively large 
due to the set of institutions (presidential regime with bicameral legislature) and political 
agents operating within the system (fragmentation and party factionalization). 
Nevertheless, despite the presence of this different types of vetoes, the system has been 
relatively stable in maintaining a systematic path in the policy making process, patterned 




2. The Budgetary Policy Making Process (BP) 
 
 
Unlike most Latin American countries, the Uruguayan budget bill is a five-year program 
(Presupuesto Quinquenal) with yearly revision bills (Rendición de Cuentas), all of them 
proposed by the Executive branch and approved by the Legislature. This uncommon 
feature shows some important tradeoffs which will be developed in further sections of 
this paper. For now, it is important to note that the budgetary process is composed by four 
stages, such as; 1) Preparation; 2) Approval; 3) Execution, and; 4) Control. Each of these 
stages is regulated by constitutional provisions that determine the role of inter-branch 
relations in the budgetary process, as well as the role of other institutions and the 
bureaucracy (Moraes and Morgenstern 1998). 
 
First, the preparation process starts at the beginning of each new administration. 
According to the Uruguayan Constitution (Art. 214), the Executive will project the bill 
with the assessment of the Office of Planning and Budget (OPP)
13 the five-year term 
national budget for the newly elected government (see Table 4). This draft will be 
submitted to the Legislative Power within the first six months after the new 





                                                 
12 Interest groups have a limited influence as agenda setters. However, those groups have an important veto 
power. Generally, interest groups exert a direct pressure on the Executive in order to modify or reverse 
some policy decisions. When those pressures are ineffective, interest groups shift their efforts towards 
Congress and particularly to the committee structure.  
13 The Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto (OPP) was created after the constitutional reform of 1967, 
and has ministerial status.  
  9Table 4: Budgetary Process of the Public Sector* 
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In order to elaborate a first draft of the budget bill, the OPP and the Ministry of Finance 
(MF) deliver to each of the twelve Ministries a set of directions or guides basically 
composed by the fiscal goals of the new government. These fiscal or spending constraints 
are the basis for each Ministry to elaborate its own budget. After this process, each 
Ministry delivers its budget to the OPP-MF to adjust the differences between the fiscal 
goals and each project sent by the twelve Ministries. Meanwhile, there is a dense process 
of political negotiation that confronts the preferences of each part. This is the core of the 
budget bill, oriented to provide the spending allocation for the central administration. 
 
The Constitution (Art. 220) also regulates the budgetary process for another set of 
important institutions aside of the central administration. In this case, the Judiciary, the 
Court of Administrative Control and the Court of Fiscal Control, the Electoral Court and 
other Decentralized Organisms, among which it can be found the Public University and 
several Public Firms and agencies, will project their own five-year budget which will be 
sent to the Executive branch. The Executive will elaborate the budget bill incorporating 
each of these projects with its own amendments.     
 
Aside from these two central parts of the budget bill, the Legislative Power (Art. 108) 
and the nineteen Intendencias (Subnational governments) are the only institutions 
allowed to make its own budget without the restrictions made by the Executive branch. 
However, as we will see below, both the Intendencias and the Legislative Power are 
subject to the external control of the Court of Fiscal Control (Filgueira 2002).  
 
Second, the approval process is regulated by a set of constitutional devices involving 
Executive-Legislative relations (see Table 4). This process is characterized by six basic 
rules: a) the Executive branch has the exclusive authority to introduce all the legislation 
concerning budget bills; b) after the bill has been introduced into the Legislature, both 
chambers have up to four months to pass or reject the bill. If the bill is rejected, the 
  10previous five-year budget is automatically endorsed. Otherwise, the bill is subject to be 
passed or c) the executive is allowed to veto the bill, partially (item veto) or as a whole 
(total veto); d) the budget has to approved by an absolute majority of the members of 
each chamber; e) the Legislature cannot increase the amounts allocated to public 
spending without specifying the sources of those new expenditures; f) the executive 
branch is allowed to deliver two complementary budget bills with changes to the original 
bill.
14   
 
Within the Legislature, each chamber has the same authority to treat the budget bill, 
given that the constitution sets a symmetrical bicameralism. Each chamber has forty five 
days to make a decision and in those cases where discrepancies arise in the last chamber, 
the bill has to be submitted to the first one, with fifteen days to achieve an agreement. If 
there is no agreement, the bill has to be considered by the General Assembly, as the 
reunion of the two chambers with other fifteen days to decide. Once the bill has been 
introduced in one of the chambers (generally the Lower Chamber), it is automatically 
redirected to the budget committee. Eventually, this committee works in coordination 
with other committees (Health, Education, Transportation, etc.) in public hearings with 
the presence of bureaucrats and the Ministers who illustrate, clarify or support the budget 
bill.
15 Finally, the committee has to pass the bill by majority rule in order to be 
considered in a plenary session. Once the bill has been passed by the last chamber or the 
General Assembly, the Executive branch can automatically endorse the bill after ten days 
or introduce its veto power. In this case, a supermajority of three-fifths in each chamber 
is needed to override the Executive veto.
16  
 
Third, the execution process depends on the bureaucracy or State apparatus, given that 
each office executes the budget allocation that was determined by the budget law (see 
Table 4). However, the extent to which each office can execute its allocations depends on 
the ability and decisions of the Ministry of Finance to execute the spending. Since the 
Ministry is who makes the money transfers to each of the programs, cash availability 
becomes a determinant factor to execute all the programs specified in the budget law. The 
law and other administrative procedures also regulate the way in which each program has 
to execute the allocations. Although the law establishes a five-year term budget, the 
allocations are made on a yearly basis. This important constraint forces each program to 
execute the allocations during the year for which the spending was programmed. 
Otherwise, if the program does not execute the allocations, the remaining revenues are 
retained by the Ministry of Finances as a way of “punishing” those inefficient programs 
unable to execute its own budget.  
 
Finally, there are two different types to controlling the budget execution (see Table 4). 
On the one hand, there is an internal control carried out by the Ministry of Finances 
                                                 
14 These complementary bills have to be treated by the budget committee.  
15 The Executive branch has an important set of specialized agencies and experts that will be in most cases 
responsible for designing public policies, further delivered to the legislative arena, among which the budget 
bills is the most important one. 
16 Before 1996, overriding vetoes required three-thirds of the General Assembly instead of the same 
majority of each chamber. The difference after the constitutional reform is huge if we consider that in order 
to sustain the veto were needed 53 against 11 after 1996.   
  11through the General Accounting Office (Contaduría General de la Nación, GAO) and the 
OPP for the case of the Central Administration (Constitution, Art. 214). In the case of the 
Judiciary and other autonomous institutions mentioned before (Art. 220), only the 
General Accounting Office is in charge of the internal control. However, for the case of 
the Legislative Power and the Decentralized institutions, such as the Public University 
and different public firms, the internal control is performed by each GAO (Art. 108 & 
221). While the GAO focuses its monitoring on the legal and administrative aspects 
(supervising the execution of every budget unit and performing the internal control of the 
operations), the OPP should evaluate the budget operations and analyze the results 
according to the programmed goals. 
 
On other hand, there is an external control for all the public administration carried out by 
the Court of Fiscal Control (Tribunal de Cuentas de la República).
17 This external control 
or oversight means that the institution monitors the administrative procedures (legality) 
followed by each program and the way the budget execution is performed by those 
programs. When the Court of Fiscal Control vetoes the way a program is executing its 
budget allocations, the program can accept the veto by reverting its actions. Otherwise, 
the Court submits the veto to the General Assembly who has the final decision.
18 
  
It is important to note that the aforementioned rules are designed to perform a technical 
control over the whole process of controlling the budget execution. Nevertheless, the role 
of the Legislature is determinant to understanding the extent to which there is also a 
political control in the way the administration is executing the budget. In this case, 
legislators and particularly opposition parties are allowed to request information and the 
attendance of Ministers and public servants to legislative committees (Art. 119). With the 
only exception of cabinet Ministers, this way of accountability does not imply that 
legislators have the authority to overthrown those responsible for the budget execution or 
public servants. Overall, the Legislature is weak in terms of controlling the budget 
execution, due to the lack of institutional resources to do so. 
 
Additionally, the Internal Auditing Office (Auditoría Interna de la Nación) depends on 
the Ministry of Finance and controls the financial management through ex ante and ex 
post monitoring, with unrestrictive access to all financial registries. This entity also 
advises the executive on issues such as the efficient use of public resources and spending 
cuts. Although the process has been relatively successful in terms of control of regularity, 
the use of the technique of budget by programs did not encourage a reasonable 
application of proper management systems. The actual changes in the budget structure 
were scarce, since there was not a deep analysis of potential goals to be achieved and 
actions to be taken, but merely a validation of a structure of entities which functioned 
within the traditional budget logic. This did not contribute in terms of rationalizing the 
whole system. During the de facto regime (particularly in the early eighties), the budget 
                                                 
17 The only exception to this rule is that the external control for the decentralized and autonomous 
institutions, the control is made by the Court of Fiscal Control and the OPP. 
18 The monitoring activities of the GAO are carried out by “Central Accountants” at every unit level. 
Sometimes, they are also appointed as “Auditing Delegates” of the Tribunal de Cuentas, creating a 
confussion of roles of internal and external auditors and blurring the respective responsibilities. 
  12readopted the spirit of the traditional techniques, although under the budget-by-program 
framework and denominations. 
 
The actual alternatives for the budget execution that the financial administration of the State 
provides are essentially constrained by the fiscal targets set by each government. As we said 
before, most agents are subject to a bargaining process with the Ministry of Finance and the 
Office of Planning and Budget. The de facto budget procedures allows the government in 
office to keep the fiscal discipline, in terms of setting caps for the public expenditure and 
aligning the spending with the priorities submitted in the macroeconomic program. Since the 
action in this process is traditional, iterative and ritualistic, these procedures do not 
guarantee or even encourage coherence and efficiency. 
 
 
3. The PMP and the Budgetary Process 
 
The Uruguayan policy making process over-determines the whole budgetary process. 
This means that despite the set of rules governing all the stages of the budgetary process, 
systemic factors dealing with inter-branch relations (Executive-Legislative) and the party 
system (number and organizational structure of parties), are more important to understand 
the budgetary process and its outcomes. Notice that we do not reject the influence exerted 
by some specific rules dealing with the president’s agenda setting powers during the 
budget proposition and approval as well as during the implementation process. Rather, 
we argue that macro-political and institutional dynamics are more powerful explanatory 
factors to understand the budgetary process in Uruguay.  
 
The reason for this over-determination of the policy-making process is twofold. On the 
one hand, the institutional dynamics dealing with the presidential regime constrain the 
ability and desires of presidents to think in long term strategies and regulations for the 
whole public administration beyond their terms.  Presidents are elected for a five-year 
term and the Uruguayan budget law is conceived as a medium-term development plan for 
each president. In turn, most presidents have attempted to pass their most important 
policy reforms within this law, which can be easily overturned during the next budget 
law. In this way, budgets have become typical omnibus bills, easily to be reverted by 
future budgets. Since this kind of laws regulate the structure and allocations of public 
spending within the administration, new budget bills may revert some reforms or 
regulations approved in previous laws. For instance, the education reform approved in 
1995 by the Sanguinetti administration has been largely debated by different sectors of 
the current incumbent party (FA) who believes that the reform was inappropriate in 
several respects and deserves to be changed again. In recent years, the government 
announced that part of that reform is going to be reverted.
19      
 
On the other hand, and more importantly, since the early nineties Uruguayan presidents 
have been forced to build post-electoral coalitions as a consequence of their political 
weakness within and outside their parties (Chasquetti 1999).These political constraints 
have been far more powerful at the time of preparing and endorsing budgets than the set 
                                                 
19 El Observador, 7/5/2005. 
  13of rules of the budgetary process by which presidents have a clear asymmetrical power 
vis-à-vis the legislature. Thus, institutional and political determinants dealing with the 
political system are largely more important than the specific set of regulations governing 
the budgetary process. 
 
This section presents a set of interactions between the broad PMP described before (with 
its actors and institutions) and the specific actors and rules involved in the BP. These 
interactions take place within each step of the budgetary process. The chapter concludes 




First, the preparation process starts at the beginning of each new administration. 
According to the Uruguayan Constitution (Art. 214), the Executive branch will project 
with the assessment of the Office of Planning and Budget (OPP)
20 the five-year term 
national budget for the newly elected government. This project or bill will be submitted 
to the Legislative Power within the next six months after the new administration takes 
office.  
 
In order to elaborate a first draft of the budget bill, the OPP and the Ministry of Finance 
(MF) deliver to each of the twelve Ministries a set of directions or guides basically 
composed by the fiscal goals of the new government. These fiscal or spending constraints 
are the basis for each Ministry to elaborate its own budget. After this process, each 
Ministry delivers its budget to the OPP-MF to adjust the differences between the fiscal 
goals and each project sent by the twelve Ministries. Meanwhile, there is a dense process 
of political negotiation that confronts the preferences of each part. This is the core of the 
budget bill, oriented to provide the spending allocation for the central administration. 
Within those expenditures, at least two factors introduce an important level of rigidity at 
the time of preparing the new budget bill: Pensions and public wages.   
 
Table 5: Structure of Non-Financial Public Sector expenditures: 1989-2002 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Wages 28% 26% 24% 22% 22% 21% 21% 22% 23% 23% 22% 23% 23% 22%
Social Security and Transfers 42% 43% 45% 48% 48% 48% 50% 50% 49% 49% 49% 49% 47% 47%
Goods and Services 10% 11% 11% 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 12% 12% 13% 12%
Interest Payments 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 6% 7% 12%
Operating Expenditures 86% 86% 86% 87% 85% 83% 87% 88% 88% 87% 88% 89% 89% 92%
Capital Expenditures 14% 14% 14% 13% 15% 17% 13% 12% 12% 13% 12% 11% 11% 8%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
 




                                                 
20 The Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto (OPP) was created after the constitutional reform of 1967, 
and has ministerial status.  As can be observed in Table 5, the number of public servants and the basic beneficiaries 
of the social security system (pensioners and retirees) is large and stable enough to 
introduce an important constrain at the time of programming budgetary allocations for a 
five-year term. These two basic public expenditures have been a systematic source of 
fiscal pressure during the last three administrations, given the fact that public servants are 
irremovable and that the demographic pyramid of the Uruguayan population (3.3 million 
inhabitants) has achieved reproductive patterns identical to those observed in 
industrialized democracies. 
 
Overall, the Uruguayan public sector has a set of rigid administrative costs that forces 
planners and politicians to focus on public investment as an adjustment variable. 
However, beyond these fiscal constraints that all governments had to face since 1985 and 
particularly since 1990, the budgetary policy has served as a strategic instrument of 
policy reform (Filgueira and Moraes 1999). In other words, although governments have 
been restraint to implement incremental changes to their budget allocations, they have 
used the budget bill as the most important programmatic instrument.  
 
Since the Uruguayan budget is a five-year term law, it has served as a medium-term 
development plan. In this context, governments not only promote their fiscal plans and 
allocations but also several policy reforms. The inclusion of these reforms has been part 
of the preparation stage, since governments will not include policy changes in the budget 
bill unless they previously count on majorities in parliament. Because of the “law of 
anticipated reactions” (Cox and Morgenstern 2001), elected presidents negotiate within 
their parties and coalitions every single piece of legislation before they get into both 
branches of parliament.
21  Essentially, during the preparation stage the budget bill 
becomes a set of windows (Kingdon 1984) of policy negotiations between and within 
parties and factions. More specifically, the budget bill is mostly negotiated at the elite 
level between party or faction leaders outside the legislature. 
 
Several important reforms have been passed during the last twenty years and others have 
failed in their attempt to be endorsed in budget bills. To a large extent, the probability of 
a certain policy to be passed within the budget bill depends on its level of negotiation 
previous incorporation into the budget. Thus, presidents and ministers who fail to link 
their policy preferences to the governmental coalition or majorities in congress usually 
fail if they attempt to pass policy reforms in the budget bill. For instance, an important 
part of the fiscal adjustment and several state and market-oriented reforms proposed by 
President Lacalle during the early nineties were disarticulated before getting into 
parliament. Further, those reforms were delivered as independent bills to congress, where 
some of them were endorsed and others rejected. Originally, Lacalle was planning an 
omnibus bill with several reforms that were vetoed by some factions of his own party and 
his coalition partners (Colorado Party). 
 
                                                 
21 Of course, some projects “born dead” or are sent without any chance of being approved. However, those 
projects serve as a position taking strategy, both for presidents, parties and individual legislators (Magar 
2002).  
  15More recently, Sanguinetti’s government (1995-2000) was able to pass important policy 
reforms in education and public administration (among other policy areas), but he failed 
to pass an important heath care reform because at the time of getting into congress the 
reform was not negotiated within the coalition and a the interest groups and corporations 
affected by the reform plan (Filgueira and Moraes 1999). While examples abound, a 
simple comparison across budgetary negotiations indicate that those presidents willing to 
negotiate their differences with their coalition partners will pass their policy preferences. 
The cost, of course will vary depending on the level of political weakness of the 
president. The higher the level of political support in the hands of presidents (within an 
outside their parties) the smaller the number of policy concessions to their partners 
(Aboal and Moraes 2003). 
 
In addition to these institutional and political features governing the preparation stage, the 
Constitution (Art. 220) also regulates the budgetary process for another set of important 
institutions aside of the central administration. In this case, the Judiciary, the Court of 
Administrative Control, the Court of Fiscal Control and several Public Firms and 
agencies will project their own five-year budget which will be sent to the Executive 
branch. The Executive will elaborate the budget bill incorporating each of these projects 
with its own amendments.     
 
The problem faced by the institutions mentioned before is that although they are entitled 
to make their own budget bills, the fact that the Executive can deliver its own bill to the 
assembly limit their ability to achieve their policy preferences. To a large extent, the 
balance between the two bills will be the product of the political strength of the president 
in the assembly, but particularly the Senate. After both bills are submitted to the 
assembly, the Senate is generally in charge for the political negotiation with the executive 
and during the approval stage the process goes back to the preparation stage because the 
president is entitled to deliver up to two Complementary Bills (Mensajes 
Complementarios) within the two months after the budget bill has been submitted to the 
assembly.  
 
In general terms, the preparation process is highly politicized in the sense that parties and 
factions compete for the better slice of the cake (as in most budgetary processes). The 
process can be opaque in that high transaction costs created by intense political 
negotiations can lead to concrete benefits with diffuse costs. However, the Uruguayan 
budgetary process is relatively transparent in that the competition between and within 
parties (among factions) usually compel these agents to “go public” with their policy 
preferences. Thus the dark or invisible side of politics is relatively buffered by the fact 
that the party system has been tremendously competitive in the long run and particularly 
since 1971 with the emergence of the Frente Amplio.      
 
3.2. Approval  
 
Second, the approval process is regulated by a set of constitutional devices involving 
Executive-Legislative relations. This process is characterized by six basic rules: a) the 
Executive branch has the exclusive authority to introduce all the legislation concerning 
  16budget bills; b) after the bill has been introduced into the Legislature, both chambers have 
up to four months to pass or reject the bill. If the bill is rejected, the previous five-year 
budget is automatically endorsed. Otherwise, the bill is subject to be passed or c) the 
executive is allowed to veto the bill, partially (item veto) or as a whole (total veto); d) the 
budget has to approved by an absolute majority of the members of each chamber; e) the 
Legislature cannot increase the amounts allocated to public spending without specifying 
the sources of those new expenditures; f) the executive branch is allowed to deliver two 
complementary budget bills with changes to the original bill.
22   
 
Within the Legislature, each chamber has the same authority to treat the budget bill, 
given that the constitution sets a symmetrical bicameralism. Each chamber has forty-five 
days to make a decision and in those cases where discrepancies arise in the last chamber, 
the bill has to be submitted to the first one, with fifteen days to achieve an agreement. If 
there is no agreement, the bill has to be considered by the General Assembly, as the 
reunion of the two chambers with other fifteen days to decide. Once the bill has been 
introduced in one of the chambers (generally the Lower Chamber), it is automatically 
redirected to the budget committee. Occasionally, this committee works in coordination 
with other committees (Health, Education, Transportation, etc.) in public hearings with 
the presence of bureaucrats and the Ministers, who illustrate, clarify or support the budget 
bill.
23 Finally, the budget committee has to pass the bill by majority rule in order to be 
considered in a plenary session. 
  
Once the bill has been passed in the last chamber or the General Assembly, the President 
can use its veto power or can facilitate an automatic endorsement after ten days of 
legislative approval. In case of veto, a supermajority of three-thirds in each chamber is 
needed to override the veto.
24 These two stages in the approval process are markedly 
different. On the one hand, achieving legislative majorities to pass budget bills has not 
been necessarily difficult during the last three governments (Lacalle 1990, Sanguinetti 
1995, Batlle 2000). The fact that all presidents have been able to build governmental 
coalitions since the democratic restoration in 1985 has guarantied enough political 
support in parliament to endorse the presidential or coalitional agenda. Indeed, this 
political support can be observed in the way budget laws have been passed in plenary 
sessions during the last twenty years, where the party discipline has been perfect for those 
within the coalition and the presidential party (Moraes and Morgenstern 1998; Koolhas 
2002).    
 
Additionally, the five-year term budget law in Uruguay is always approved during the 
“honeymoon” between presidents and citizens with high levels of party discipline in 
parliament (see Figures 2 & 3). The budget bill is negotiated and passed no latter than 
January of the second year of government. With this deadline, coalition members are still 
                                                 
22 These complementary bills have to be treated by the budget committee.  
23 The Executive branch has an important set of specialized agencies and experts that will be in most cases 
responsible for designing public policies, further delivered to the legislative arena, among which the budget 
bills is the most important own. 
24 Before 1996, overriding vetoes required three-thirds of the General Assembly instead of the same 
majority of each chamber. The difference after the constitutional reform is huge if we consider that in order 
to sustain the veto were needed 53 against 11 after 1996.   
  17able to negotiate their differences and are far enough from elections to avoid electoral costs 
if the policy agenda turns out to be unpopular in those cases where fiscal adjustments have 
been part of the budget bill. Nonetheless, all bills serve as position taking instruments for 
those who promote and oppose a certain policy. Indeed, legislators frequently achieve 
agreements that they know are going to be vetoed by the president. Thus, most budget laws 
are also subject to a game of position taking in which individual legislators, factions and 
parties promote policies without any chance of being passed.  
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After approval in both chambers of parliament, presidents usually veto some parts of the 
legislation with which they disagree. However, at this point of the term presidents are strong 
enough to sustain most of their policy preferences. Overriding executive vetoes is less 
frequent during the fist-half of presidential mandates than during the second half, when 
presidents generally loose their political support, coalitions fall apart and parties and factions 
are inclined towards the electoral competition. Overall, budgets are passed without important 
contingencies in parliament within the first year of each government. However, to a large 
extent this “smooth” process is explained by the fact that presidents have to negotiate and 
anticipate contingencies that can potentially mean political defeats in parliament.   
 
Within this context, since the Lacalle administration (1990-1994), presidents have been able to 
“impose” that beyond the five-year term budget law (see Appendix 3), each yearly revision 
will not modify the spending allocations and the provisions set at the original budget law. 
This strategy has been followed in order to avoid negotiations every single year, with the 
potential cost of political defeats for presidents after the second or third year of 
government. With only few exceptions, since 1993 presidents have endorsed yearly 
revisions (Rendiciones de Cuentas) with a “single-article no-expenditures” (SANE). More 
particularly, all yearly revisions after 1993 were delivered to the legislature with SANE 
with the exception of 1997 when only six articles were included to increase the allocations 
in public schools, and 2000 when three more articles increased the allocations to the 
  18military and the police. In 2002, the economic debacle forced the executive to make a 
tremendous fiscal adjustment that was obviously processed trough the yearly revision for 
that year. In this case, the executive delivered a bill with 163 articles (see Appendix 3, 
Table 3.2).  
 
A variant of this scenario has been a reversion point by which no budget bill can be passed 
due to the lack of votes in parliament, in which case the president gets what he or she 
wants: the original budget allocations made in the original five-year term budget law. A 
good example of this is exemplified by the last two yearly revisions made by the Batlle 
administration (see Appendix 3, Table 3.2). In this case, the Senate was unable to achieve 
enough votes to pass the bill approved by the lower chamber and the president won his 
battle to sustain the original bill with SANE or what is the same, the original allocations 
made at the quinquennial budget bill. The strategy followed in recent years by the 
executive branch after the five-year budget law is approved has forced parties and factions 
to negotiate their differences during this process instead of each annual revision.  
 
Why do parties and particularly factions endorse yearly revisions with SANE, even when 
executives are under minority condition in parliament? A tentative explanation is that the 
policy preferences of both traditional parties (Blancos and Colorados) have converged in 
their policy preferences over fiscal policy during the last decade. This point allows us to 
explain why Lacalle was able to pass a yearly revision in 1994 with SANE when he was a 
minority within his party and had no coalition partners to support his policies. An 
alternative explanation is that this policy convergence is endogenous to the scope of 
political competition. More particularly, since the Frente Amplio was an increasing 
electoral threat for Blancos and Colorados, fiscal discipline was presented by these parties 
as a good policy on which both had responsibility. Further, the second Sanguinetti 
administration (1995-2000) had the same features in terms of convergence over fiscal 
policy. In this case, the Blanco party was a coalition partner of the Colorado, supporting 
almost all policy reforms and bills delivered by the executive to the parliament. Notice that 
the Frente Amplio increased its share of votes in about 10 percent per election between 
















  19 
Figure 4 
Legislative allocations over execuive proposal (Index) and GDP 
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Figure 4 illustrates the way in which the legislature changed the original budget allocations 
for each year proposed by the Executive branch during the former Batlle administration 
(2000-2005). A more detail description of this index with the data used for the calculations 
can be found in Appendix 2. The index captures the absolute change between the original 
proposal and the amounts allocated by the legislature for each program or agency and by 
extension the whole budget bill. The figure shows at least two tentative conclusions. On the 
one hand, that the legislature certainly changes the allocations made by the executive 
branch in the five-year budget bill. However, this changes are relatively marginal in terms 
of the overall budget expenditures and as a proportion of the GDP (see Appendix 2). On the 
other hand and more importantly, both branches of government elaborate and pass a 
quinquennial budget bill without having a clear notion of what is going on with the overall 
macroeconomic performance for the years to come. As can also be observed in Figure 4, 
the Uruguayan GDP plummeted in 2001 although the allocation of expenditures made at 
the outset where supposed to remain stable for 2002 and 2003. In this context, the yearly 
revisions are supposed to serve as a mechanism to adjust the availability of resources to 
finance programmed expenditures. Since 1993 the executive never used the annual 
revisions to cut or introduce new expenditures, but with the economic downturn of 2001 
the executive had to introduce a fiscal adjustment modifying the expenditures allocated for 
2002 and 2003.   
 
3.3. Execution and Monitoring 
 
The execution and monitoring of the budget bill depends to a large extent on the executive 
branch. First, the execution takes place on each office where budget allocations have been 
  20made. However, unlike other cases in Latin America (Baldez and Carey 1999), the way in 
which the budget bill is legally structured does not allow for discretion in the hands of 
bureaucrats or public servants, because each program has very specified budget allocations 
in all the items on which public expenditures are structured (wages, investments, 
administrative costs, etc…). In turn, the execution in the hands of the executive branch 
depends to a large extent on its own level of cash (or credit) availability.   
 
Although, bureaucrats or public servants do not have almost any kind of discretion over 
budget expenditures or the ability to decide over certain unspecified funds, the fact that the 
executive can “declare” the lack of funds to finance certain allocations specified in the 
budget bill creates a de facto mechanism to shirk the law. Particularly during the Batlle 
administration and the economic crisis that has sealed this government since the year 2000, 
the executive branch has systematically shirked its obligations with several institutions of 
the public sector because of the lack of funds. This lack of resources is based on a 
consistent policy to avoid printing money to finance programmed activities if public 
revenues are not enough. In sum, the executive branch executes budget allocations 
depending on its level of cash (or credit) availability. If economic shocks appear and the 
government does not have the sources to cover the expenditures set at the budget bill, it 
usually affects the investments planned in the budget law. Thus, losers are always those 
affected by purchases of the state (i.e. private sector) or clients of the state (citizens), 
because public wages have been always paid, even under the worse economic conditions.   
 
This kind of discretion over the execution has been the source of important political 
conflicts in two different arenas. On the one hand, it has caused struggles within the public 
sector between the executive branch and particularly the ministry of finance with labor 
unions for the lack of resources to finance budget allocations. Given that the Uruguayan 
public sector employs around 20% of the economically active population, conflicts within 
the public sector have been frequent and tremendously expensive for the public sector. On 
the other hand, these conflicts have had political consequences, in the sense that 
government and opposition have been systematically confronted for the way in which the 
administration creates a de facto mechanism to automatically adjust public expenditures 
when it does not have the resources to finance the budget bill. In this way, under the fiscal 
constraints observed in recent years, inflation is more likely to be controlled but at the cost 
of violating important legal obligations setup in the budget bill. Notice that political 
conflict here is endogenous to the level of fiscal constraint. 
 
Second, the process of monitoring is also influenced by political developments and 
particularly the dynamics of party politics and governmental coalitions. One of the most 
evident cases during recent years has been that the same parties or coalition of parties 
(Nacionalistas and Colorados) controlling the executive branch have been the majority in 
those institutions responsible for controlling and monitoring the budget execution. This has 
been a relatively important source of inefficiency in the public sector with some 
consequences for the level of transparency. Furthermore, in those cases where the Tribunal 
de Cuentas de la Nacion (TCN) has identified illegal expenditures, the executive had to rely 
on the final resolution of the legislature who is in charge to judge in those cases where 
discrepancies arise. However, given that the legislature has been controlled by the same 
  21coalition of parties joining the executive cabinet, the legislature has been reluctant to make 
sentences against the executive branch and particularly the subnational governments under 
the political control of the same parties (Nacional and Colorado).  
 
 
3.4. Drawing Hypothesis  
 
From the previous two sections it is possible to observe that some political institutions and 
actors are tremendously important over the whole process of negotiation and decision 
making over budgetary policy, and particularly the type of interbranch relations and the 
number of agents or veto players involved. In other words, the influence of interbranch 
relations, the type of government (coalitions, single parties and minority governments) and 
the number of parties and factions with legislative representation are tremendously 
powerful factors influencing the level of sustainability and representativeness of the public 
expenditures. However, the same is not necessarily true for the level of efficiency. In this 
case, more specific rules governing the budget execution and monitoring are more powerful 
explanatory factors of the level of efficiency. In this case, the institutional capacity of 
public agencies, the amount and quality of the information, the human resources and the 
legal instruments with which the public sector has to deal with the execution and 
monitoring are more powerful explanations for the level of efficiency in public 
expenditures.  
 
Within that context, we propose eight hypotheses to be developed in the next section. 
Hypotheses 1 to 5 have to do with the level of sustainability of public expenditures, where 
we link political institutions and actors to fiscal performance. Hypotheses 6 to 8 are 
focused on the level of efficiency in public expenditures and Hypothesis 9 deals with the 
level of representativeness of public expenditures. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Public expenditures fluctuate with the electoral or presidential cycle. 
A primary consequence of this trend is that during the last decades electoral years 
show a clear tendency towards fiscal imbalances. This leads only to short term 
sustainability problems in public expenditures, because most second years of each 
term show fiscal adjustments to counterbalance the previous electoral cycle.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Uruguayan constitutional rules have changed dramatically since 
the early twenties; however, constitutionally powerful presidents (unlike 
collegial governments 1952-1966) do not have lower fiscal deficits. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Given that transaction costs are expected to increase with the 
number of political agents negotiating the budget bill: The larger the number of 
veto players (Hyp.3a=parties, Hyp.3b= factions) the larger the level fiscal 
imbalance.    
 
Hypothesis 4. Given that elections affect the behavior of incumbents and their 
propensity to increase public expenditures during electoral years, higher levels 
of electoral threat will create higher fiscal imbalances.  
  22Hypothesis 5. Presidents who have to negotiate governmental coalitions with 
opposition parties have larger fiscal imbalances.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Efficiency problems arise because the budget bill has been used as 
an instrument for fiscal control. The execution stage is frequently affected by the 
level of cash availability and the fiscal program set by the ministry of finance, 
generally oriented to restrain public expenditures when external shocks occur.     
 
Hypothesis 7. Efficiency problems during the execution stage are partly due to 
the fact that there is no legislative influence over this process. Legislators and 
the legislature as a whole have almost no influence after the budget has been 
approved.   
 
Hypothesis 8. Interest groups and labor unions are relevant actors only at the 
approval stage of the budget bill, where they can exert public pressure over 
parties, factions and the executive branch. This pressure is oriented to change 




4. Explaining Sustainability, Efficiency and Representativeness 
 
 
4.1. Recent trends in Fiscal Outcomes. 
 
During the late eighties, the economy recovered from the 1982 crisis but high levels of 
inflation persisted, and the average deficit for the decade was 5.5% of GDP. This was 
connected to an improvement in the situation of the region as a whole, a fall in oil prices, a 
rise in internal demand and a fall in interest rates. Income increased thanks to economic 
expansion, and because of a reduction in the weight of debt interest payments which 
resulted from the first re-negotiation of the debt and a fall in interest rates. Nevertheless, 
the fiscal balance was still in deficit. The possibilities of financing it were limited given the 
high level of accumulated debt and the high inflation rates. Additionally, there was a 
constitutional reform in 1989 which index-linked social security expenditures to past 
inflation rates, and this severely compromised the fiscal balance for the future.  
 
In 1990 a new stabilization plan came into operation and a considerable fiscal adjustment 
took place, basically aimed at increasing income from taxation. Expenditure did not 
decrease very much because allocations to the social security system were particularly 
rigid. However, expenditure on interest payments fell as a consequence of Uruguay joining 
the Brady Plan. As a result of the fiscal adjustment, the primary surplus was 3.1% of GDP, 
while the conventional deficit fell from 6.9% to 3.1% of GDP. Another adjustment took 
place in 1992, including a partial reform in the social security arena. In 1995, with the 
increase in expenditure on social security, there was a new fiscal adjustment which 
involved a new increase in income from taxation, and restraint in expenditure. Also in 
1995, a reform of the social security system was passed (this is described in more detail in 
  23the appropriate section) which ended the upward trend in expenditure on social security 
that had been making fiscal policy untenable. In 1996, a plan to reduce the number of 
public employees, which was aimed at reducing costs in this area, began to come into 
operation. 
 
The primary deficit was always above what was necessary to stabilize the debt/product 
ratio of the previous year, and there was always the possibility of financing the deficit with 
external resources given that there was access to these funds (Borchardt, 1998, Rial, 2002). 
Additionally, the predominant view within the private sector was that the State would 
continue to be solvent, so fiscal policy seemed to be sustainable and solvent in the period 
(Rial, 2002). In spite of this, fiscal policy appeared to be potentially vulnerable in the face 
of big fluctuations in one of its fundamental determinants, the gap between devaluation and 
inflation. Vulnerability to the other relevant factors, interest rates and product, does not 
seem to have been significant (Rial, 2002). Towards 1999, problems began to emerge, 
making visible the vulnerability of the situation. A general deterioration in the regional 
situation took place, Brazil devalued its currency in 1999 and Argentina was hit by 
devaluation and recession in 2001.  
 
In the face of these shocks there was no big adjustment in the Uruguayan economy, and in 
particular there was no serious devaluation, but there was a primary deficit of 1% after a 
decade of positive results. The deficit stood at around 4% of GDP. Since there was no 
problem about access to credit the deficit was financed in that way, and the gross debt rose 
from 40% to 55% of GDP while the net debt increased from 27% to 36% of GDP. In this 
context, solvency indicators fell rapidly. Hence, for example, the primary surplus necessary 
to maintain the same level of debt as the previous year rose to 8.5% of GDP, while the 
increase in income needed for this same purpose came to 5% of GDP. These figures were 
difficult to reach given that fiscal pressure after the successive fiscal adjustments was 31% 
of GDP, the highest in South America. Given that fiscal adjustment on the side of 
expenditure was not possible either, due to rigidity problems already mentioned, there did 
not seem to be any real solutions on the fiscal policy side to maintain exchange rate policy.  
 
In 2002 exchange rate policy was abandoned and the exchange rate was allowed to float 
freely. The fiscal deficit was maintained at 4% of GDP and there was a considerable 
increase in debt, which was no more than the manifestation of the latent risk mentioned 
above (Rial, 2002). The immediate consequence was that the country lost the investment 
grade status, and there was a big rise in the cost of financing. Besides, the banking crisis 
led to the execution of contingent liabilities (the implicit deposit insurance) amounting to 
the equivalent of 15% of GDP, which was covered by increased indebtedness to 
multilateral organizations. 
 
Overall, almost all of the items on the spending side of the budget are essentially rigid and 
non-discretionary. Broadly speaking, half of public expenditures go to social security and 
one fourth goes to wages. Interests and debt repayment are also outside the government 
control. Therefore, the “adjustment variable” of spending to the evolution of fiscal income 
(which is very pro-cyclical) is the public sector investment. The volatility in this item is the 
result of the absence of anti-cyclical mechanisms in the remaining items of public 
  24spending, in a context in which tax burden had reached a point where it is difficult to 
impose any new increase. 
 
 
4.2. Sustainability in Public Expenditures: looking at Politics and Institutions. 
 
This section tests the effects of political institutions and party politics on the level of 
sustainability in public expenditures in Uruguay. First, we test the extent to which fiscal 
imbalances are more likely during electoral years (Hypothesis 1). The rationale behind this 
hypothesis is that politicians tend to be opportunistic and electoral years give them an 
excellent opportunity to deliver public goods (both on a universal and particularistic 
fashion) in order to advance their political careers. While this hypothesis has found 
evidence in cross-country studies for Latin America and Western democracies (Alesina 
1996; Alesina et al. 1997) there is less evidence within cases or across time for particular 
cases. Furthermore, a test of this particular hypothesis in the Uruguayan case is particularly 
interesting, because of its democratic tradition and the strength of its political parties in the 
long run.  
 
 
Figure 5: Electoral Cycles and Fiscal Performance (1942-2000) 
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As can be observed in Figure 5, there is a remarkable electoral cycle in Uruguay. Data on 
fiscal performance was gathered for the 1924-1999 period, and electoral years are simply 
codified as 0, -1 for pre-electoral years, and values of 1 and 2 are subsequent pos-electoral 
years (Aboal and Moraes 2003). The evidence shows that during electoral years (year =0), 
governments are more likely to perform fiscal imbalances, while post-electoral years are 
systematically used to perform fiscal adjustments to counterbalance electoral years. In 
other words, in the long run Uruguayan governments have used public spending in an 
opportunistic fashion, in order to gain reelection or buffering electoral losses. In terms of 
sustainability of public expenditures, this behavior is mostly associated to short terms 
  25problems, given that in the long run this imbalances are compensated. That is, short term 
imbalances in electoral years are compensated by surpluses in post-electoral years.  
 
Second, we test the extent to which more hierarchical institutions have better fiscal results 
(Hypothesis 2). The overall consensus in the literature is that vertical instead of horizontal 
interactions among agents within governments are more likely to generate fiscal constraints 
(Alesina 1996; Alesina et al. 1997). Thus, it is expected that presidents with strong agenda 
setting powers in the form of legislative powers (budget initiation, partial veto, etc.) will 
have better fiscal results compared with those who do not have such institutional devices. 
The Uruguayan case shows an important variation across time in terms of presidential 
powers but the 1967 constitutional reform shows a major step towards the creation a strong 
institutional president with several legislative and non legislative powers to set the 
governmental agenda (Shugart and Carey 1992). Presidents elected before 1967 were 
relatively weak to the extent that they lack the constitutional powers to control the 




Figure 6: Presidential Power and Fiscal Performance 
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Figure 6 uses a dummy variable to codify the pre (0) and post (1) 1967 constitution. The 
figure reveals that constitutionally powerful presidents do not have (on average) better 
fiscal performances compared to weak presidents or more collegial governments (between 
1952 and 1967). All the cases (N=33) clustered “after 1967” are characterized for being 
constitutionally strong presidents elected under the 1967 constitution and the constitutional 
amendment endorsed in 1996. In general terms, presidentialism or more hierarchical 
institutions do not necessarily leads to better fiscal results. Rather, institutionally weak 
executives have better fiscal results on average. Part of the explanation for these 
preliminary results rests on the fact that most presidents after 1971 and particularly since 
1984 have had to face a politically weak condition in parliament. In some cases the 
  26presidents’ party has hold a minority of seats in parliament but in others presidents have 
also been a minority within their own parties. Overall, most presidents since the democratic 
restoration have been constitutionally strong but politically weak. Thus, problems of 
sustainability (if any) have to be explained by political rather than institutional 
determinants dealing with the set of formal powers in the hands of presidents.    
 
This evidence appears to contradict a certain consensus that strong presidential institutions 
are more conducive for better fiscal results. According to comparative studies on budget 
institutions and fiscal performance, certain cases in the region and abroad indicate that 
strong presidents tend to have better fiscal performances compared with those who are not 
entitled to set the agenda and particularly the budget bill (See among others; Baldez and 
Carey 1999). However, in cases like Chile or Brazil (among others) it remains unclear if 
the main cause of changes in fiscal performance during recent years come from 
constitutional changes or a shift in the policy preferences of political parties. For instance, 
in the case of Chile, it is not clear if it is the constitutional change during the authoritarian 
period what explains the current fiscal behavior of the Concertación government or the fact 
that the parties within the coalition have radically different policy preferences from that 
they hold before 1973. Arguably, we are attributing to institutional changes the main cause 
of recent fiscal trends what can be attributed to changes in the policy preferences. 
Moreover and going back to the Uruguayan case, the same institutions have shown 
completely different fiscal results between 1985 and 2005.   
 
Third, we also test the extent to which the number of veto players in the party system 
affects transaction costs (Hypothesis 3a & b) and by extension the fiscal performance. In 
this case, we use the Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) and the 
Effective Number of Factions, which is an application of Laakso and Tagapera’s formula 
using the number of lists to the Uruguayan senate as the best proxy of a faction in this case 
(Buquet et al. 1998). As we observed in tables 1 and 3, the number of parties and factions 


















  27Figures 7& 8 
Effective Number of Parties and Factions and Fiscal Performance 
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The evidence in Figures 7 and 8 sheds light into our previous data and particularly Figure 
5, where institutionally strong presidents have comparatively bad fiscal results. In this 
case, a larger number of parties do not affect the fiscal performance. Moreover, the 
transition from bipartism to multipartism has a relatively positive effect on fiscal 
behavior. Nevertheless, the number of factions has an inverse effect. In this case, the total 
number of factions in the party system appears to have a negative effect on fiscal 
performance. In essence, the number of parties and factions are intertwined in the sense 
that a larger number of parties (as it has been the case in recent decades) yield a larger 
number of factions. However, the effects of each of these factors are substantially 
different.   
 
Fourth, we test the extent to which the electoral calendar constitutes a major incentive to 
increase public expenditures for incumbent governments who have major electoral threats 
(Hypothesis 4). This hypothesis “controls” the expectations produced by Hypothesis 1, 
since large deficits in electoral years can be better explained by the level of electoral 
competition rather than strictly institutional factors dealing with presidential term. In this 
case, electoral competition is measured as the ratio between the vote share received by 
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Figure 9: Electoral Competition and Fiscal Performance 
Ratio (electoral competition)































































As can be observed in Figure 9 the level of electoral competition goes in the same 
direction of the electoral cycle in Hypothesis 1. Smaller electoral margins induce 
presidents to spend more and vice versa. However, notice that most presidents with 
narrow electoral victories were elected after 1971. The emergence of the Frente Amplio 
appears to be an important threat for incumbent governments of Blancos and Colorados 
since the preautoritarian process and particularly since the democratic restoration in 1985.  
 
Finally, we test the extent to which coalition governments have larger fiscal imbalances 
(Hypothesis 5).
25 Notice that coalition governments do not necessarily have a majority 
status in parliament (Strom 1990), but we codified coalitions as a simple dummy variable 
for those cases where the president holds a majority coalition in parliament. As we 
argued before, Uruguayan presidents have had to negotiate governmental coalitions, 
generally between Nacionalistas and Colorados. The singularity of the Uruguayan case is 
that in order to build these coalition it is necessary the coordination of all factions within 





                                                 
25 There are competing arguments dealing with the effects of coalition governments over fiscal 
performance. The evidence for most European countries shows that coalition governments have been 
fiscally restrictive in recent decades. However, coalitions in most Latin American cases show mixed 
results. Chile has shown a very restrictive fiscal behavior since the democratic restoration, but in the case of 
Brazil only in recent years (during the Cardozo administration) the governmental coalition achieved major 
fiscal improvements. In the Uruguayan case, coalitions have had mixed results. Lacalle’s coalition (1990-
1992) was able to implement two important fiscal adjustments (1990 & 1992) plus a restrictive budget bill. 
However, President Batlle, who has been the weakest political president in Uruguayan history, was unable 
to control the demands within his coalition, where his faction was a clear minority (see Chart X). 
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Figure 10: Governmental Coalitions and Fiscal Performance 



































As can be observed in Figure 10, the evidence is not conclusive whatsoever. On average, 
there is no difference between coalition governments and other types of political 
arrangements (minority party, minority coalitions or majority party). Theoretically, it is 
reasonable to think that coalition governments will be more likely to show more agents or 
veto players compared to other political configurations whose potential divergent policy 
preferences can be observed in our data. Indeed, during the Batlle coalition (2000-2002) 
the Blanco ministers spent (on average) more than Colorado ministers (see Appendix 2, 
Table 4). However, according to Figure 10, there seems to be no clear distinction 
between coalition governments and other political configurations, although the variance 
within coalition governments is much smaller. A possible explanation for this evidence is 
that almost all coalition governments are temporally located during and after the nineties, 
and this is the period in which Blancos and Colorados agreed to implement a restrictive 
fiscal policy. Further, regression analysis may help to capture the effect of coalition 
governments on fiscal policy. 
 
 
4.3. Combining effects. 
 
Given our expectations for Hypotheses 1-5, we test a regression model (OLS) including 
all the political and institutional factors mentioned before, where the endogenous variable 
is the fiscal balance over the GDP for 1942-2000. The model goes as follows:   
 






  30Where: 
Eyear = Electoral Year (1= electoral year, 0=other) 
Presp = Presidential Power (1= after 1967, 0=other) 
ENP = Effective Number of Parties 
ENF = Effective Number of Factions 
Comp = Ratio of electoral competition 
Coal = Coalition Government (1=coalition, 0=other) 




Political and Institutional determinants of Fiscal Performance 
Uruguay 1942-2000. (Dependent Variable = Fiscal Balance/GDP) 
Fiscal Balance  Beta Coef.  Std. Err.  P>t 
      
Electoral Year  -1.01 0.57  0.082 
Presidential Power  -2.40 0.61  0.000 
Effective # Parties  4.80 0.62  0.000 
Effective # Factions  -1.32 0.30  0.000 
Electoral Competition  -7.90 1.51  0.000 
Coalition 1.04 0.88  0.242 
 anomal59  1.42 1.66  0.396 
 Congela69  2.80 1.11  0.015 
 anomal83  -1.52 1.70  0.374 
 anomal94  1.58 1.76  0.374 
_cons 0.23 0.77  0.761 
      
N 59    
Prob > F       0.000    
R-squared 0.641    
Adj R-squared  0.566    
 
 
As can be observed, the regression in Table 7 allows us to disentangle the effects 
produced by of each of the hypothesis mentioned before. First, the most interesting 
finding deals with the level of significance of Electoral Year (Hypothesis 1). 
Descriptively, this factor appeared to have a clear trend where electoral years showed 
larger fiscal imbalances compared to any other year during term mandates. However, 
Hypothesis 4 (as a competing hypothesis) dealing with the level of electoral competition 
shows a clearer effect on fiscal balances. That is, the level of electoral competition is 
more relevant to explain the fiscal performance. In any case, both variables have the 
expected sign.    
 
Second, as we argued before, presidents elected with strong constitutional powers (or 
agenda setting powers) after 1967 have (on average) a worse fiscal performance 
compared with presidents elected under the 1942 and 1952 (collegial) constitutions. 
Third, the Effective Number of Parties and Factions have an inverse effect on fiscal 
balance, being both statistically significant. The number of parties appears to have a 
positive effect, tending to ameliorate the fiscal performance. The increase in the number 
  31of parties for the period (1971-2000) coincides –prima facie- with a more restrictive 
fiscal policy implemented during the nineties. However, the number of factions has an 
inverse relationship with fiscal behavior. Part of the explanation for this result comes 
from the fact that during the sixties, as one of the worse economic and particularly 
fiscally problematic decades in Uruguayan history, the number of factions was 
particularly high (even under a bipartisan context). Fourthly, coalitions have a positive 
effect on fiscal balance. However, the coefficient for this variable is not statistically 
significant and it is not possible to draw any finalistic conclusion on its effects. In any 
case, the sign of the coefficient tends to coincide with those arguments by which 
governmental coalitions have a relatively positive effect on fiscal behavior.  
 
 
4.4. Efficiency: Looking at the Budget execution and monitoring 
 
Hipothesis 6 argues that “efficiency problems arise because the budget bill has been used 
as an instrument for fiscal control”. The basis of our demonstration rest on the extent to 
which the executive branch actually executes the provisions made in the original bill 
endorsed by the parliament. The budget execution is regulated by Constitutional and legal 
provisions, where the Ordered Text of Financial Accounting and Administration plays a 
central role (Texto Ordenado de Contabilidad y Administración Financiera, TOCAF 
heretofore). There have been a large number of changes during the last years that led to a 
relatively complex legal framework with a generally obscure process. Within the 
framework of an intended global administrative reform of the State, a new regime of 
financial control was set in 1996.  
 
More recently, under the new and still under transition Integrated System of Financial 
Information (Sistema Integrado de Información Financiera, SIIF heretofore), every 
administrative unit (Inciso) is responsible for all the execution phases: authorized budget 
credits and their modifications, commitments, obligations and payments. Before the 
implementation of the SIIF, the Uruguayan public administration was featured by several 
drawbacks. Since the General Budget covered a five-year period, the units operated with 
estimated credits. This system led the Rendición de Cuentas (or annual budget revisions) 
to become actual new budgets on a yearly basis, since the Constitution allowed to change 
global amounts, reallocate investment expenditures and wages, and to create, eliminate or 
modify programs with an explicit and justified cause. 
 
More importantly, the system of estimated credits has driven agents responsible for the 
execution to perform higher and/or smaller amounts than those set by the parliament. 
This feature influenced the following process leading to an excessively centralized 
procedure which did not guaranteed that the execution out passed the legal previsions. 
The process of monitoring is generally based on the information on bank account 
movements for each office to which a certain budget allocation has been made. This 
requires that the item discrimination of the expenditures had to be done separately by 
complex checking procedures. In general, there are no mechanisms to coordinate the pace 
of the budget programming and control. Indeed, the cash flow administration does not 
  32allow to systematically monitor the generation of payment obligations vis-à-vis the 
budget authorized credits. 
 
The SIIF intends to develop and evaluate the budget execution, conceiving it as a legal 
financial plan, considering the estimated resources and the allocations stipulated for all 
governmental programs.
26 The System uses an Annual Cash Program, which seeks to 
make payments consistent on cash availability, setting maximum amounts to spend by 
unit and by expenditure item. Every unit should elaborate its own annual plan, which has 
to be negotiated with the Treasury. In order to centralize the operations, a unique account 
of the National Treasury is used. Every unit registers the transactions, but they have to be 
validated by the General Accounting Office of the Ministry of Finance. As a general rule, 
it is not possible to make any transaction into the System without the validation of the 
corresponding budget credit. The key point, however, is that the cash availability depends 
on the overall macroeconomic performance. Given the economic crisis that Uruguay 
faced since the year 2000, the gap between the amounts allocated by the budget bill and 
the cash availability have reduced the efficacy and the efficiency of most governmental 














Central Administration -0.005 -0.006 0.008 0.012
Descentralized Agencies -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.005
Debt services -0.039 -0.048 -0.072 -0.105
2000 2001 2002 2003
 
         Source: MEF/ICP (see Appendix 2) 
 
 
                                                 
26 The SIIF is composed by for sub-systems: Budget Information, Treasury Information, Accounting 
Information, and Budget Evaluation. The second one includes the Resources Information System and the 
Spending Execution System. The latter uses an Annual Cash Program, which seeks to make payments 
consistent with cash availability, setting maximum amounts to spend by unit and by expenditure item. 
Every unit should elaborate its own annual plan, which has to be negotiated with the Treasury. In order to 
centralize the operations, a unique account of the National Treasury is used. Every unit registers 
  33Figure 11 shows the gap between the allocation of expenditures made in the original 
budget law and the overall execution for the Central Administration (13 ministries plus 
the Presidency), the decentralized organisms (see Appendix 2) and the debt services for 
2000-2004. As can be observed, the 2002 economic downturn had an impressive impact 
over the levels of budget execution or the extent to which the Executive power actually 
allocated the funds stipulated in the budget bill. Furthermore, since 2002, the executive 
imposed a tremendous adjustment in the central administration that was relatively 
followed by the set of decentralized agencies. More importantly, Figure 11 shows that in 
2002 and particularly 2003, the vast majority of the amounts not allocated by the 
executive branch were redirected to pay debt services.     
 
The evidence depicted in Figure 11 reveals the coordination problems caused by the type 
of execution recently performed by the executive branch. The executive’s decision to 
avoid executing programmed expenditures creates a coordination problem between 
spending programs and the Treasury office, which is in charge for authorizing credits. 
The latter is actually performed by the Ministry of Finance based tax revenues and public 
debt, making the budget execution depending on the evolution of the macroeconomic 
financial program. Therefore, due to these persistent problems during the execution stage 
in recent years, the budget has not been properly used as an effective instrument to 
manage governmental agencies and expenditures. This problem also makes extremely 
difficult a reasonable evaluation of the level of efficacy and efficiency in the use of 
public resources. Moreover, the clear “fiscal dominance” that is imposed on the budget 
execution and the absence of a programmatic logic leads to evaluate the process mainly 
though the lenses of those who control the fiscal performance. In this sense, most of the 
time the budget can bee seen as a mere list of financial credits instead of being a powerful 
tool for an effective planning.  
 
An important piece of evidence dealing with problems of efficiency during the execution 
process is that the Uruguayan state is systematically challenged in courts and has to pay 
significant amounts of money every year because of formal or substantial errors and 
inadequate actions. However, it is very rare to see judicial cases against civil servants or 
official authorities in which the State repeats against the actual responsible for budget 
execution decisions when misconducts or inappropriate situations emerge. This weak 
enforcement framework can she some light in terms of explaining why the processes of 
execution and control are essentially simultaneous, at least at the Central Administration 
level; it is very complicated to pay without the proper ex ante control and validation of 
the budget credit for the specific expenditure   
 
Additionally, the lack of specialised staff or specific courts has not been compensated 
with resources that could allow the subcontracting of these activities (Bergara, 2003). 
Proceedings at the Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo (TCA) are usually very 
costly and the administrative staff has essentially the typical features of the Uruguayan 
bureaucracy. Sentences from the TCA tend to take years, particularly when some political 
and economic complexity is involved (Bergara et al., 2004). Therefore, the ability of the 
Judiciary to punish budget execution decisions exists, but it could be of little material 
impact in most of the cases. Furthermore, in those cases in which civil servants are 
  34involved in illicit activities, they are extremely difficult to sanction and remove, most of 
them because of their irremovable condition and others due to implicit incentives of 
managers and unions in the public sector.
27  
 
In terms of control, the new SIIF lacks the ability to develop proper auditing activities. 
The “Delegated Auditors” of the Tribunal de Cuentas monitor the units operations, but 
they cannot ban the expenditure to be done, particularly in the case of subnational 
governments (Filgueira 2002). Periodically, the Tribunal de Cuentas reports to the 
Congress about their formal and substantial observations, but in fact this information is 
rarely used by legislators.  
 
 
4.5. The Political Control of the Execution: legislative oversight? 
 
As we argued in Hypothesis 7, the legislature has a very limited influence over the budget 
execution producing efficiency problems during this stage of the budgetary process. In 
general terms, Uruguayan legislators and the legislature as a whole have no mechanisms 
to control the execution process. Indeed, the legislature relies on the information and 
human resources provided by the executive branch and the institutions in charge of that 
process. Tables 8 and 9 show data coming from an elite survey (n=146) conducted in 
2004 by the Instituto de Ciencia Politica (UDELAR, 2003). The data shows that with the 
only exception of the executive branch almost all the actors involved in the budgetary 
process consider that the legislature has a weak level of control over the budget 
execution.   
 
 
Table 7: Legislative Influence in Executive Control (percentages)  








NA -  2.6  2.6  -  0.9 
Not influencing  1.6  -  12.8  7.9  4.6 
Somewhat influencing  44.3  36.8  56.4  60.5  54.2 
Very influencing  41.0  52.6  28.2  23.7  33.8 
Extremely influencing  13.1  7.9  -  7.9  6.5 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 










                                                 
27 Under the Uruguayan, only the legislature is entitled to remove public servants who commit severe 
violations to public laws and statutes. 
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Unions  Total 
Not influencing  4.9  5.3  20.5  21.1  11.1 
Somewhat influencing  52.5  55.3  56.4  34.2  56.0 
Very influencing  36.1  31.6  17.9  23.7  25.0 
Extremely influencing  6.6  7.9  5.1  21.1  7.9 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 
        Source: Buquet 2004, Encuesta Uruguaya de Elites. ICP-UDELAR 
 
 
Table 8 reports that the legislature has some important level of control over the executive 
branch. Overall, both executive officials and legislators consider that the legislature 
controls the executive in general terms. However, this dominant opinion among 
politicians is in sharp contrast with the evidence provided in Table 9, where the same 
elites are asked about the budget execution. In this case, there is an overwhelming and 
consistent perception across elites that the legislature does not control the executive 
branch during the execution process.
 28 The explanation for this perception comes from 
the fact that legislators do not have institutional resources to perform and adequate 
oversight. On the one hand, legislators do not have staff or human resources qualified to 
design public policies and control the budget execution. In all cases, the information to 
analyze the budget execution comes from the Executive branch. On the other hand, the 
legislature as such does not have the institutional capacity to oversight the executive 
branch and particularly the budget execution, because it does not have offices and 
professional staff to perform this function and provide independent information. Thus, 
the legislature depends on the information and human resources provided by the 
executive branch to control the budget execution.  
 
The question here is if a legislative oversight would improve the overall level of 
efficiency of the budget execution. In other words, why it would be better if legislators 
had the opportunity to control or monitor the budget execution with independent 
information and institutional resources internal to the parliament? So far, the evidence for 
the U.S. case suggests that when public servants are monitored by legislators the level of 
                                                 
28 The Uruguayan parliament has a very small budget compared to the executive branch and other 
legislatures in Latin America. Individual legislators can count on small funds to finance and solve their 
particular needs in terms of staff, information (press and magazines) and logistic or administrative 
resources. The internal institutions oriented to fulfill the legislator’s needs are scarce and weak in terms of 
human resources and technical knowledge on public policies. In 1997, the IADB financed a large research 
project to evaluate the viability to introduce a permanent technical staff to support legislators’ work in 
different policy areas. However, Uruguayan legislators and particularly the administrative staff frustrated 
the reform. Uruguayan politicians have been reluctant to accept think tanks and individual researchers in 
specialized policy areas of strategic importance, such as telecommunications, energy and also institutional 
or political reforms. The legislature and individual legislators have followed two types of bypasses to solve 
the lack of technical knowledge. On the one hand, since the legislature delegates a large part of the policy 
design into the executive branch, all committees ask for information and the opinion of ministers and public 
firms directors in order to have more informed decisions. On the other hand, legislators are allowed to 
request the transfer of public servants to work in their particular staff, but this mechanism does not 
guaranties any technical expertise and has also been use as a clientelistic practice.    
  36accountability of public servants increases and it is expected that their survival or the 
level of spending allocated to a certain program in the future will depend on their 
efficiency to perform their functions (Mccubbins and Schwartz 1984). If legislators or the 
legislature as a whole does not have the information on how the state or government is 
executing the budget allocations made by parliament, public agencies will not have 
strong incentives to fulfil their goals, because there is no threat on their survival. Overall, 




4.6. Representativeness.  
 
As stated in Hypothesis 8, interest groups and labor unions are relevant actors only at the 
approval stage of the budget bill, where they can exert public pressure over parties, 
factions and the executive branch. Overall, the approval process in parliament takes place 
within a relatively participatory frame, where the budget and finance committee work 
together receiving interest groups and labor unions interested in the new budget bill. 
Given that the legislature works with the executive proposal, the committee stage is 
systematically informed by members of the cabinet and the bureaucracy who provide 
information and the prospects for the new budget for each program. Thus, numerous 
sessions are joined by committee members and members from other committees affected 
by some particular decisions under discussion, cabinet members and interest groups 
(generally in the form of corporate business or labor union representatives). 
 
This dynamic is not essentially different to the one observed at the approval stage during 
the discussion of other important bills. Essentially, the budget is not an outlier in the 
legislature, in terms of the form by which the institution involves other institutions and 
groups within the electorate. However, since the budget bill is the most important law to 
be endorsed by parliament, the process acquires a particular dynamic of intense debate 
during the first six moths of each elected government, after the executive sets its 
priorities of public spending and the elimination/creation of new programs or policies.  
  
Interest groups and labor unions are important only during the approval stage. This is 
largely because during the elaboration process the executive sets the agenda according to 
its macroeconomic expectations and the policy preferences of the governing party or 
coalition of parties. Once the priorities of the executive branch are set, interest groups and 
other organizations within civil society begin their mobilization to advance their policy 
preferences or veto the executive’s plan.  
 
During recent years governmental coalitions have lead the process of negotiation and 
design of the budget bill. As we have said before, this process takes place at the elite 
level among party leaders. These political agents are faction leaders with legislative 
representation and most of them are Senators that, given the features of the Uruguayan 
  37electoral system, are able to discipline members of the lower chamber.
29 Overall, 
negotiations to set the basic features of the budget bill take place outside the legislature. 
 
 
Table 9: Legislative Influence over Budget Design (percentages) 








NA -  -  2.6  -  0.5 
Not influencing  6.6  -  2.6  13.2  6.0 
Somewhat  influencing  44.3  42.1 20.5 39.5  37.5 
Very  influencing  32.8  39.5 28.2 28.9  32.9 
Extremely  influencing  16.4  18.4 46.2 18.4  23.1 
Total  100  100 100 100  100 
Source: Buquet 2004, Encuesta Uruguaya de Elites. ICP-UDELAR 
 
 
As can be observed in Table 9, the fact that the legislature has been weak in setting the 
budgetary agenda is revealed by the own opinion of Uruguayan legislators. About 50% of 
surveyed legislators have a rather weak perception of their influence over budget policy. 
Even legislators who had a relatively positive opinion on their own jobs in terms of 
fiscalizing the executive branch (see Table 7 above) they have a predominantly negative 
perception on their ability to capture the agenda setting process during the budget 
proposal. A very similar perception is observed among labor union members, where 
about 53% tend to observe a weak influence of legislators during the budget design. This 
particular group has been the most critical of the overall economic policy implemented 
since the early nineties, where the budget policy has been a fundamental piece of most 
fiscal adjustments and the state or administrative reform. Inversely, members of the 
executive branch and the business sector have a rather positive perception on the extent to 
which the legislature shapes the budget bill. These two sectors and particularly the 
business corporations have been very critical of the workings of the legislature in 
budgetary issues and the legislature in general.  
 
 
4.7. Budgets, Representation and Public Policy Reforms. 
 
The extent to which interest groups and the civil society is involved in the budgetary 
process depends to a large extent on the contents of the budget bill delivered by the 
executive branch to parliament. Since budget bills have been frequently used to introduce 
important policy reforms, it has been an important source of political conflict and 
particularly a source to activate the veto power of some interest groups with an important 
electoral connection.   
 
Particularly, since the democratic restoration in 1985, budget bills have become more and 
more omnicomprehensive in the kind of regulations incorporated in the norm (Filgueira 
                                                 
29 Notice that some important faction leaders like former presidents Lacalle and Sanguinetti are not 
senators, but are faction leaders anyway.   
  38and Moraes 1999). On the one hand, part of the explanation for this tendency comes from 
the fact that parties and factions know in advance that cooperation periods are short, 
particularly when presidents are politically weak within and outside their parties. In this 
case, the budget bill becomes an important window of negotiations for those who are not 
in government but have votes to support the coalition or the president’s party. On the 
other hand, it is arguable that more policies and reforms are included in the budget bill 
because there are more agents within government pushing to pass their policy 
preferences. This process has opened the doors for a more strident interaction between 
the government and the set of groups and interests affected by the budget bill and 
sometimes the yearly revisions (Rendiciones de Cuenta), which have been also 
sporadically used to introduce reforms in public services and welfare benefits
30.  
 
Since the budgetary process within parliament is relatively participatory, the fact that 
budgets have become mostly omnibus-bills has opened the channels to activate the 
demands of interest groups to either block or promote their policy preferences in a more 
visible fashion. The extent to which the government will be more likely to pass its policy 
reforms depends on how presidents’ link different political resources to block the 
pressure of some powerful interest groups with strong electoral ties. In particular, there 
are four important policy areas in which interest groups and the civil society in general 
have displayed their ability to influence the budgetary policy process.  
 
First, one of the most striking policy reforms during the last decades was introduced in 
1992, within a budget revision. Since Lacalle took office in 1990, he had to face the a 
social security reform passed in a plebiscite in 1989. This reform had constitutional status 
and basically implied that all social security payments would be adjusted every four 
months based on past inflation rates. In this context, Lacalle attempted several times to 
reform the social security system in order to reduce the relative size of this sector in the 
overall budget and the economy in general. Lacalle failed to reform the system in 
consecutive bills delivered to congress in 1990 and 1991. However, in 1992, Lacalle 
introduced a pension system reform in the yearly revision. The reform was not structural 
but entailed an important adjustment in the retirement age and the amounts to be paid 
according to different income thresholds. The reform quickly activated (again) the 
Association of Pensioners and Retirees which was able to organize and pass the 
constitutional reform –via plebiscite- that Lacalle was already paying for. Once again, the 
corporation was able to collect the required number of signatures and the reform was 
finally revoked in 1994 with the support of all parties competing in the national elections, 
with the additional prohibition to introduce social security reforms in budget bills and 
yearly revisions.       
 
Second, the education reform passed within the 1995 budget bill is an example of 
successful linkage of political resources made by the president to obstruct the movement 
of unionized teachers (Filgueira and Moraes 1999). The president was able to hold tightly 
                                                 
30 For instance, within the 1992 Rendicion de Cuentas the Lacalle administration introduced a social 
security reform that that automatically activated the veto of the association of pensioners and retirees. The 
reform was finally derogated in a plebiscite that banned the ability of the executive branch to introduce 
social security reforms within budgets or yearly revisions (Filgueira and Moraes 1999). 
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reform was technically and politically convenient. The only potential and to some extent 
natural political support for the teacher’s unions was the left wing Frente Amplio which 
was relatively divided in their support to this particular reform. The new policy was 
strongly promoted by its own creator, former chair of ECLAC in Uruguay German Rama, 
and had very diffuse costs and benefits. This was a facilitating condition in order to 
defend the proposal within the electorate, given that the reform introduced an extension 
in public services at the primary, secondary and technical education. The reform was 
finally passed after a strong technical and political battle by all coalition members, 
isolating the labor movement of teachers without a consistent technical and political 
support. Indeed, the reform was endorsed by a majority of legislators from the opposition 
party, in addition to all coalition members.  
 
Third, within the same paradigmatic budget bill of 1995, the same government put 
forward a health care reform in public services. The reform was also strongly promoted 
by its own creator, minister of Heath, Ricardo Solari (Filgueira and Moraes 1999). 
However, unlike the education reform mentioned before, this case had clear concentrated 
costs with diffused benefits. Who was supposed to endorse the project? The minister was 
unable to use the political resources provided by the coalition. Furthermore, instead of 
negotiating within the coalition he “went public” without a clear argument determining 
who was supposed to win with his reform plan. Solari’s reform attempted to create a set 
of legal instruments to improve the efficiency in budget transfers to the private sector. 
Essentially, the reform was intended to curtail public subsidies to the private health care 
system, where the sub-sector located in the interior of the country was perceived as the 
most (potentially) affected by the new reform.  
 
The Uruguayan medical corporation is powerful. But the strategy used by the medical 
corporation of the interior of the country was tremendously efficient in order to block the 
reform. Essentially, the lobby was focused on deputies from the interior of the country. 
Given that 11 out of 19 districts elect their deputies in binominal districts, exerting 
pressure over this set of representatives was not a difficult task and it was enough to 
achieve the status quo. The reform was finally blocked by deputies from the interior of 
the country. The committee started to work with the reform delivered by the executive 
and the number of changes to the executive proposal was large enough to be afraid of a 
potential executive veto, unlikely to be withdrawn. Thus, modifying the original proposal 
had an implicit veto threat, but withdrawing the key articles including the reform did not, 
because there is no subject of veto. This is what the health committee basically did in 
order block an ambitious health care reform, where a powerful corporation won the 
battle.    
 
Finally, the current quinquennial budget bill approved in 2000 has also a relevant 
example of policy reform. In this case, the executive branch delivered a bill with an 
ambitious reform in the telecommunications sector. This policy area is almost entirely a 
monopoly controlled by the state. After Lacalle’s attempt to privatize ANTEL in 1992, 
there were no serious attempts to discuss privatizations in Uruguay. Lacalle attempted to 
privatize public firms and particularly the telecommunications sector but lost his battle in 
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Batlle attempted again to reform part of this sector via the budget bill. In this case, Batlle 
introduced a reform plan to sell part of the company dedicated to cellular telephony 
(ANCEL) under control of ANTEL. However, the labor movement (PIT-CNT) again 
activated its veto power by collecting signatures to call for a new plebiscite in case the 
norm would be approved by parliament. The initiative was immediately supported by the 
Frente Amplio as the major opposition party, with a clear chance to win the 2004 
elections. Anticipating a clear defeat at the polls, the coalition of Blancos and Colorados 
withdrew the articles privatizing part of ANCEL and the plebiscite did not took place.
31   
 
Overall, interest groups exert pressure at the approval stage in parliament. Using four 
cases of policy reform, this section attempted to show that interest groups remain 
important only at this stage of the BP. Interest groups are not essentially powerful within 
the whole political system. Indeed, Uruguayan elites generally perceive that organized 
groups are not very powerful actors in determining policy outputs. Their strength and 
veto power over public policies and the budget bill in particular depends on the policy 
area under consideration, the party or parties in office and how groups are able to link 
their interest to a brother set of interests with a clear electoral connection.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper argues that the budgetary process in Uruguay determines the sustainability, 
efficiency and representativeness of public expenditures. In order to understand why the 
budget process has such a powerful influence, we argued that not only institutional but 
also political factors are determinant in order to understand public expenditures.    
 
In terms of sustainability of public expenditures, we argue that institutional factors are 
relevant but not determinant to understand fiscal outcomes. Institutional factors like 
presidential terms or fixed mandates, which have been argued to be one of the main 
causes of an opportunistic behaviour of incumbent governments, are not a powerful 
predictor of fiscal outcomes. Moreover, the constitutional powers entitled to the 
executive branch after the 1967 constitution reveals that the fiscal performance of elected 
after the reform have not had better or more sustainable fiscal outcomes compared to 
presidents or executives constitutionally weak. Rather, the paper argues that political 
factors dealing with the number of actors and the scope of political or electoral 
competition is a much more powerful predictor of fiscal results. The level of electoral 
threat (or chances or gaining reelection) for those parties in government and the number 
of actors (particularly factions) in the party system appears to be important factors 
influencing the level of fiscal sustainability in the short run.  
 
In terms of efficiency, the paper shows that the execution process of the budget bill is the 
key stage to understand the way in which public expenditures are actually allocated. In 
                                                 
31 The same project created a regulatory Agency of Communication Services (URSEC). This important 
agency was part Batlle’s plan but did not entail any threat for those activating the veto against the 
privatization of ANCEL.  
  41particular, we argued that during the execution process, the executive branch has low 
levels of internal and external control and monitoring. Since the budget bill is generally 
used as an instrument of the fiscal program, the extent to which the executive executes 
the budget bill depends on public resources or cash availability. However, given that the 
executive branch has given priority to fiscal outcomes regardless of the budget 
allocations made by parliament, most programs within the public administration have 
shown problems to perform their functions, producing obvious problems of efficiency. 
This performance was aggravated by the recent economic crisis, where the executive 
branch avoided the execution of most programmed expenditures to perform a sever 
adjustment oriented to pay debt services. In this context, the oversight performed by 
parliament is poor, not only because it does not have the institutional power and 
resources to perform such the control but because coalition governments with majorities 
in parliament have facilitated the fiscal orientation of elected presidents.  
 
In terms of representativeness in the budgetary process, the paper showed that the 
legislature has a weak influence during the design process. This process is in the hands of 
the executive branch and particularly the coalition members during the last three 
governments. Once the bill gets into parliament, the new budget proposal generally 
activates the demands of different interest groups and organization of the civil society. 
The power of these groups to veto the executive proposal regarding some programs or 
policies will depend on the ability of presidents to hold a tight legislative majority in 
congress to support the bill. However, the extent to which those groups link their 
preferences to a broader political or electoral context is also a determining factor to 
explain the influence exerted by those groups during the approval process.  Overall, most 
interest groups and the civil society in general intervene during the approval process, 
given that the executive is in charge for designing or setting the spending priorities and 
policy reforms.   
 
Is there any trade off between sustainability, efficiency and representativeness? To a 
certain extent it is reasonable to speculate that increases in representativeness can affect 
both sustainability and efficiency. The Uruguayan case appears to be an interesting case 
to observe this trade off, since some institutional devices like referendums and plebiscites 
have been widely used to veto executive proposals or advance the demands of specific 
groups within the electorate. In some cases, plebiscites and referendums have implied an 
increase in public expenditures such as the constitutional reform promoted by pensioners 
and retirees in 1989. In order to pay for the reform, the Lacalle administration had to 
implement an important fiscal adjustment with severe costs for some state programs. 
Thus it is arguable that variations in the level of representativeness can affect how 
sustainable or efficient is the overall public spending.  
 
Similarly, efficiency is not costless. In other words, in most cases the Uruguayan state 
cannot afford certain enforcement technologies that can improve the overall level of 
efficiency. Part of this problem can be observed in the amount of lawsuits that the state 
faces every year for inefficiency problems. Thus, there can be a trade off between the 
sustainability of public expenditures and the level of efficiency of those expenditures.      
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the Uruguayan electorate voted for the first time in history for a non-traditional party 
(Blanco or Colorado) to occupy the executive branch. Since March 1
st of 2005, the Frente 
Amplio will have to design a new budget bill under a completely different political 
context to that observed during the last decades. On the one hand, unlike all presidents 
since 1966, the Frente Amplio will hold a majority of seats in parliament. This political 
support will facilitate a negotiation only within the party, instead of the traditional within-
and-outside negotiations performed after the democratic restoration. On the other hand, 
although the Frente Amplio is the most factionalized party in the system, the elected 
president Tabaré Vázquez appointed all faction leaders to cabinet posts to ensure party 
discipline in parliament. These two factors are expected to be determinant during the 
negotiation process of the new budget bill during the next six months and are seen as 
positive indicators.    
 
Beyond this political configuration, the Frente Amplio takes office under an auspicious 
macroeconomic context both at the national and regional level. The new budget bill will 
be passed by parliament under high GDP growth rates, moderate inflation and decreasing 
levels of unemployment. Regarding our three dimensions under study, party leaders of 
the of the new administration have declared their intention to (a) continue with a policy 
of fiscal contention of public expenditures (without limiting social spending), (b) open 
the doors for a more participatory budgetary process, thus improving the level of 
representativeness during the design process instead of the approval stage, and (b) 
increasing the level of efficiency in the public administration with an adequate state 
reform. If this is the case, the new government does not observe major trade-offs between 
our three dimensions, but the country faces important challenges in the short and medium 
run dealing with debt payments that will inevitably constrain an optimal strategy of 
improving in a simultaneous fashion the sustainability, efficiency and representativeness 
of public expenditures.  
 
Policy or Political Recommendations? 
 
In the context of our concluding remarks, this paper suggests three broad 
recommendations. First and more importantly, several parts of this paper show that 
problems of efficiency and sustainability are due to the fact that the budgetary policy is 
used as an instrument to control the overall fiscal performance of governments. Since the 
execution stage is usually affected by problems of cash availability, public investment is 
frequently manipulated creating dysfunctions in specific private markets and the 
economy of individual citizens. The origin of this problem rest in that the budget is not 
conceived as a part of a broad macroeconomic program for each government. The most 
important recommendation of this paper is that the budget bill has to be inscribed at the 
core of such a broad macroeconomic planning, where the annual revisions have to be 
used as a mechanism to correct or adjust the actual macroeconomic performance with the 
original plan. 
 
Second, in terms of sustainability the budget bill has to be conceived as a set of 
intertemporal agreements, beyond the party or coalition of parties in government. Since 
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government (one year beyond the presidential mandate), future governments do not 
necessarily have to agree with the policy preferences of past administrations and may 
overturn important regulations. Moreover, since the last three governments have used the 
budget bill as an instrument to pass important reforms in areas like education, social 
security, health or civil service, these reforms can be easily reverted by future 
administrations. Thus, budgets have not to be used as omnibus bills to pass such reforms 
unless they are passed with special majorities ensuring that future majorities will not 
overturn passed reforms.  
 
Finally, in terms of representation and accountability one of the chronic problems when 
the legislature treats the budget bill and the annual revisions is its inability to handle 
budgetary problems. The legislative branch is institutionally weak vis-à-vis the executive 
because it has not the power to introduce the budget, but it has the ability to modify the 
bill. On the one hand, legislators taken individually do not have appropriate personnel to 
advice in budgetary and fiscal issues, which causes legal and technical problems during 
the execution. Legislators are allowed to have a maximum of five advisors coming from 
the public administration, but in most cases these advisors work in administrative tasks 
rather than policy design or research. On the other, the legislature as such does not have a 
specialized office in charge for the design of the budget bill, the legal problems it arises 
and the macro and microeconomic consequences of its approval. For instance, the budget 
committee (among others) does not have any office to advice in budgetary matters or 
perform any kind of contracting out service to work with the budget bill. Furthermore, all 
informational resources come from the executive and the parliament depends on those 
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      Table 1. Political Cycles and Legislative Dynamichs * 
Year Relevant  Laws  Executive  Vetos  President 
1988 15  2 
1986 12  3 
1987 6  6 
1988 5  5 
1989 6  8 
Sanguinetti 
1990 9  2 
1991 9  3 
1992 9  2 
1993 1  4 
1994 5  13 
Lacalle 
1995 9  1 
1996 8  1 
1997 6  0 
1998 4  1 
1999 7  2 
Sanguinetti 
2000 6  3 
2001 6  4 
2002 12  0 
2003 3  1 
2004 1  3 
Batlle 




Table 2. Number of Public Servants and Pensioners/Retirees: Uruguay 1997-2003* 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Public  Servants  248.792 246.899 240.451 236.908 235.296 234.265 230.418 
Pensions/Retirees  725.5  730.884 727.995 722.999 717.572  716.55  715.258 
Total  974.292 977.783 968.446 959.907 952.868 950.815 945.676 
* Source: Cepre 2003 
 
 
Table 3. Distribution of Public Employees. 1985-2002* 
  1985 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Local  Governments  13% 14% 15% 15% 15% 16% 16% 16% 16% 15% 
State-Owned  Enterprises 21% 16% 15% 17% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 15% 
Central  Administration  41% 39% 40% 39% 39% 38% 39% 39% 40% 40% 
Other  25% 32% 30% 29% 30% 30% 29% 29% 29% 30% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
* Source: Cepre 2003 
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Table 1. 
Legislative allocations over budget proposals  
(values = absolute value of executive proposal – legislative allocation)* 
Program – Agency  2000  2001  2002  20003  2004 
Presidency  12260  38156 37099 37254 37616 
Ministery  of  Defense  73141  73602 73602 73602 73602 
Ministery  of  Interior  206368  78016 78016 78016 78016 
Ministery  Finance  1408  14792 14792 14792 14792 
Ministery of Foreing Affairs  0  4648  4648  4648  4648 
Ministery of Agriculture and..  4070  90882  90882  90882  90882 
Ministery of Industry  0  0  0  0  2324 
Ministery  of  Turism  0  0 0 0 0 
Ministery of Transportation   462  462  462  462  462 
Ministery  of  Education  144625  8584 8584 8584 8584 
Ministery  of  Health  0  36238 37238 38238 40238 
Ministery of Labor and Social Sequrity  0  13944  19094  19094  13944 
Ministery of Housing and Envirnoment  0  0  0  0  0 
Ministery of Youth and Sports  0  1046  1046  1046  1046 
        
Total Central Administration   - -  - - - 
        
Desembolsos financieros del Estado  12629  0  0  0  0 
Subsidies  and  subventions  1701  15815 15815 15815 15815 
Transferences to Social Sequrity system  0  116200  0  0  0 
Partidas  a  replicar  0  0 0 0 0 
Other  credits  11286  213799 328823 334930 443653 
        
Judiciary  0  36678 50629 63139 77471 
Accounting  Tribunal  0  0 0 0 0 
Electoral  Court  0  31214 31281 24142 17512 
Administrative  Court  0  0 0 0 0 
National Administration of Public 
Education 
0  378600 494800 611000 727200 
Universidad de la Republica  0  0  0  0  0 
Institute for the Childhood.  0  0  0  0  0 
        
Total Descentralized Agencies (Art.220)        
        
INDEX  233975  576338  643405.5 707822 823903 
Index/GDP  0.001  0.002 0.003 0.003   
Total Budget (const.$= 2000)  60490850  61474838  62615027  62702232  62608460 
Total Budget/GDP (const.$= 2000)  0.25  0.26  0.29  0.28  - 
GDP (const.$= 2000)  243027071  236871455  219406261  222158541   
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Differences between Legislative allocations and Executive execution of the budget bill * 
Program – Agency  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Presidency -31679  83342  131336  239944 
Ministery of Defense  -674523  -418781  195313  656167 
Ministery of Interior  -193342  36299  433924  737213 
Ministery  Finance  164477 269393 355367 480511 
Ministery of Foreing Affairs  -189459  -211444  -435510  -526970 
Ministery of Agriculture and..  5337  15265  188535  254582 
Ministery of Industry  121109  108559  117032  128161 
Ministery of Turism  38217  31535  37800  60432 
Ministery of Transportation   601819  -132540  884345  302169 
Ministery of Education  -8784  134956  225048  322390 
Ministery of Health  -1582748  -873650  -296118  -148267 
Ministery of Labor and Social Sequrity  65817  98214  -204077  -276885 
Ministery of Housing and Envirnoment  -121855  -443033  68359  324724 
Ministery of Youth and Sports  169267  -17236  11900  30379 
        
Total Central Administration   -1636348  -1319122  1713256 2584550 
        
Desembolsos financieros del Estado  -3463891  -4169299  -9186765  -18716088 
Subsidies and subventions  -581378  -683473  -231558  254436 
Transferences to Social Sequrity system  -7077813  -8082847  -7397801  -4281818 
Partidas a replicar  -3935936  -4298485  -5283164  -7230459 
Other  credits  5512345 5900795 6388026 6721544 
        
Sub-total -9546673  -11333310  -15711262 -23252385 
        
Total Executive Branch  -11183021  -12652431  -13998006 -20667835 
        
Judiciary  -279970 -300385 -177720  91144 
Accounting  Tribunal  -1423 -21633 -12878  -1015 
Electoral Court  -90087  -118260  -56131  59250 
Administrative Court  -9027  -13447  -9988  4901 
National Administration of Public 
Education -1799313  -1655870  -984969  613486 
Universidad de la Republica  -503375  -586079  -87615  132764 
Institute for the Childhood.  -433957  -446261  -304941  189003 
        
Total Descentralized Agencies (Art.220)  -3117151  -3141935  -1634243 -1089533 
        
Total  -14300172 -15794366 -15632249 -21757368 
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Table 3 
Index of Legislative allocations over executive proposals * 
 2000 2001 2002  2003 
GDP   24.3 23.7 21.9  22.2 
Index   0.0 0.1 0.1  0.1 




Public Expenditures and Type of Government (coalition =2000-2001)* 
 2000  2001  2002  Average 
 Average PN Ministers  89,6  93,5  106,9  96.7 
 Average PC Ministers  105,4  97,6  109,4  104.1 
* Note: Blanco ministers = Housing, Sports, Labor, Education, Industry and Agriculture. Colorado ministers = 
Defense, interior, finances, foreign affairs, transportation, tourism and health. This table shows the average 
spending of Colorado (incumbent) and Blanco ministers, regarding allocated expenditures. The 
Batlle’s administration had 7 Colorado and 6 Blanco ministers. Table 4 shows that on average, 
Blanco ministers spent more during the years in which this party was within the coalition. 
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Budget Laws 1985-2004 













tions Override  Approval  #  Articles
15809  1985-90  31-08-85  SENATE  22-10-85  HOUSE  05-11-85  20-12-85  SENATE    21-12-85 10-01-86  27-01-86  Yes  07-03-86 No  08-04-86    690
16170  1990-95 04-09-90  HOUSE  19-10-90                   
                   
                   
SENATE  22-10-90 06-12-90 HOUSE 11-12-90 19-12-90 26-12-90 Yes  27-12-90 No 28-12-90 720
16736  1995-00 05-09-95  HOUSE  19-10-95 SENATE  23-10-95 07-12-95 HOUSE 12-12-95 20-12-95 27-12-95 Yes  02-01-96 Yes  * 05-01-96 772
17296  2000-05 05-09-00  HOUSE  20-10-00 SENATE  24-10-00 09-12-00 HOUSE 11-02-00 21-12-00 11-01-01 Yes  14-02-01 Yes  * 21-02-01 650
* Partial override  
1.1  Annual Revision 1985-2004 
N°Law            Year
Send 
(Executive) Chamber Approval 
2
nd 
Chamber Introduction Approval 
3
rd 





ons Override  Approval #  Articles
15767                            1984  26-06-85 SENATE 08-08-85 HOUSE 13-08-85 11-09-85 No No No No No  No No 13-09-85 72
Rejected                             
                         
                         
                       
                         
                           
                         
                         
                       
                           
                         
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                         
                           
1985  01-07-86 SENATE 15-08-86 HOUSE 26-08-86 09-10-86 SENATE 13-10-86 29-10-86 30-10-86  * No No No No
15851 **  1985  28-11-86 SENATE 10-12-86 HOUSE 01-11-86 16-12-86 No No No No Yes 17-12-86 No 24-12-86 231
15903 1986  17-06-87 HOUSE 01-08-87 SENATE 03-08-86 18-09-87  HOUSE 19-09-86 01-10-87 15-10-87 No  No No 10-11-87 638
16002 1987  05-07-88 HOUSE 18-08-88 SENATE 23-08-88 07-10-88  HOUSE 18-10-88 01-11-88 11-11-88  Yes 17-11-88 No 25-11-88 165
16105 1988  10-07-89 HOUSE 22-08-89 SENATE 23-08-89 11-10-89  HOUSE 11-10-89 11-10-89 26-10-89 No  No No 23-01-90 10
16134 1989  03-07-89 HOUSE 13-08-90 SENATE 15-08-90 20-09-90 No No No No No  No No 24-09-90 111
16226 1990  02-07-91 HOUSE 16-08-91 SENATE 19-08-91 04-10-91  HOUSE 05-10-91 22-10-91 15-10-91 No  No No 29-10-91 501
16320 1991  01-07-92 HOUSE 15-08-92 SENATE 18-08-92 02-10-92  HOUSE 04-10-92 16-10-92 18-10-92 No  No No 01-11-92 512
16462 1992  29-06-93 HOUSE 13-08-93 SENATE 18-08-93 02-10-93  HOUSE 04-10-93 14-10-93 27-10-93  Yes 22-12-93 Yes 11-01-94 276
16591 1993  05-07-94 HOUSE 17-08-94 SENATE 19-08-94 05-10-94 No No No No No  No No 13-10-94 1
16723 1994  04-07-95 HOUSE 15-08-95 SENATE 17-08-95 05-10-95  HOUSE 09-10-95 18-10-95 No No  No No 01-11-95 1
16769 1995  03-07-96 HOUSE 16-08-96 SENATE 20-08-96 12-09-96 No No No No No  No No 23-09-96 1
16878 1996  02-07-97 HOUSE 13-08-97 SENATE 18-08-97 30-09-97 No No No No No  No No 14-10-97 1
16996 1997  28-07-98 HOUSE 10-08-98 SENATE 12-08-98 28-08-98 No No No No No  No No 01-09-98 6
17214 1998  13-07-99 HOUSE 17-08-99 SENATE 18-08-99 15-09-99 No No No No No  No No 24-09-99 1
17269 1999  04-07-00 HOUSE 10-08-00 SENATE 15-08-00 20-09-00 No No No No No  No No 28-09-00 3
17403 2000  03-07-01 HOUSE 14-08-01 SENATE 17-08-01 03-10-01 No No No No No  No No 16-10-01 1
17556 2001  02-07-02 HOUSE 15-08-02 SENATE 12-09-02 12-09-02 No No No No No  No No 18-09-02 163
Rejected  2992  01-07-03 HOUSE  15-08-03 *** No No No No No No No No  No No No No
Rejected  2003  07-07-04 HOUSE  19-08-04 *** No No No No No No No No  No No No No
* General Assembly rejected the bill 
** Substitutive bill 
*** House rejects the bill 
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